

MINUTES OF A MEETING OF THE JOINT INDEPENDENT AUDIT COMMITTEE HELD AT POLICE HEADQUARTERS, KIDLINGTON ON 18 DECEMBER 2019 COMMENCING AT 10.30AM AND CONCLUDING AT 12:43PM

Committee Members Present:

Dr L Lee (Chairman), Mike Day, Richard Jones, Alison Phillips OBE, Dr G A Woods

Present:

A Stansfeld (Police & Crime Commissioner)
J Hogg (Deputy Chief Constable)
P Hammond (Chief Executive, OPCC)
I Thompson (Chief Finance Officer, OPCC)
L Waters (Director of Finance)
R France (Chief Supt.)
A Cooper (Director of Information)
S Patel (Associate Partner, EY)
C Sha (Assistant Manager, EY)
N Shovell (Chief Internal Auditor, TVP & OPCC)
A Shearn (Principal, Auditor, TVP & OPCC)
M Horne (Governance & Service Improvement)
A Portch (Corporate Governance Officer)
C Roberts (Executive Assistant to the PCC/DPCC, OPCC)

Apologies:

M Barber (Deputy Police & Crime Commissioner)

APOLOGIES

The Chair, Louis Lee (LL) welcomed everyone to the meeting and apologies were given for the Deputy PCC.

1. MINUTES OF THE LAST MEETING HELD ON 4 OCTOBER 2019 (Part I)

The minutes of the last meeting held on 4 October 2019 were agreed albeit the following comments were noted:

Richard Jones (RJ) expressed his concerns as to the receiving of agenda papers. The Committee liked to receive hard copies as well as by email in order to write their comments on and the agendas therefore needed to be received a week before and sent out much earlier. Attendees were asked to provide agenda items to Charlotte Roberts much earlier. It was suggested that Paul Hammond (PH) would liaise with the Force to review arrangements to ensure the timely receipt of reports and circulation of Committee papers. (RJ) also noted that on page 4 of the minutes the word 'actuary advice' should be 'actuarial advice' although (CR) confirmed this had already been amended and re-uploaded to the OPCC website.

Action: (PH) to liaise with the Force to review and agree arrangements for submitting agenda items to (CR) for the JIAC Agendas.

On page 5 of the minutes in the second paragraph it read '*but HMICFRS indicated that this was overall a national crisis...*' (RJ) asked whether these words were correct and the Deputy Chief Constable Jason Hogg (JH) confirmed that the wording was indeed correct.

On page 12 Minute 9, the overdue priority 1 rated actions needed to be amended to reflect 10 priority instead of 1. (CR) confirmed that this had already been updated and re-uploaded on to the OPCC website having had an earlier conversation with Amy Shearn (AS).

The Committee thanked (CR) for producing an excellent set of minutes.

2. ACTIONS ARISING FROM THE MEETING ON 4 OCTOBER 2019

The Committee noted the actions arising from the meeting on 4 October and were very pleased to see all of the actions had been completed.

3. ANNUAL ASSURANCE REPORT

(LL) introduced the Committee's Annual Assurance Report.

In respect of Financial Management and Reporting he commented on the excellent report from EY. The Committee noted with approval that EY issued an unqualified opinion on the financial statements and that they were able to issue their report before the 31 July deadline. This was due to the excellent project planning between the OPCC and the Force Finance Department and their effective working relationship with external audit staff.

With the Committee having considered all the information available, they were satisfied that both the PCC's Chief Finance Officer and the Force Director of Finance had demonstrated the necessary capability and capacity to ensure the proper administration of the PCC's and Force's financial affairs. The experience and skills of the two individuals and the teams that lead had been of real benefit to the PCC and the Force and the Committee commended their efforts and achievements.

Internal Control and Governance Environment - In July, the Committee received an annual report from the Director of Information, as the Senior Information Risk Owner (SIRO), which provided a summary across both TVP and Hampshire Constabulary for the information assurance and information governance during 2018/19. This had provided assurance that information risks were being managed effectively and highlighted some of the key decisions that had been escalated to the (SIRO) during the year.

The Anti-Fraud, Bribery and Corruption Policy had been approved in December 2018 setting out a broad systemic approach to creating the right cultures and practices in the organisation. The Committee received a report in October 2019 which demonstrated the application that the policy identified, investigated and applied appropriate sanctions and also provided specific detail about the effective identification and response to issues raised by the Professional & Ethical Standards Panel (PESP) and Counter Corruption Unit.

The Committee had received regular updates on the new Enterprise Resource Planning (ERP) programme which provided information on the technical progress with development and implementation across Surrey, Sussex and TVP. The Committee believes that this is an area of significant ongoing operational and financial risk for TVP and will continue to monitor and scrutinise the governance and VFM arrangements closely throughout 2020.

Based on the information that had been provided to the Committee over the last 12 months, the Committee provided assurance that to the best of their knowledge, the corporate governance framework within Thames Valley was working efficiently and effectively.

Corporate Risk Management - The Committee confirmed that with regard to the OPCC Strategic Risk Register, they were content that any weaknesses found were being proactively addressed but the Committee would continue to monitor findings.

Business Continuity - TVP had delivered 13 table top Business Continuity exercises over the last year working with LPAs, project leads, the OPCC and other departments to ensure that all key areas in TVP had up-to-date and relevant Business Continuity plans in place. The Committee were content that Business Continuity was treated seriously by senior officers within the Force and that regular and practical exercises were undertaken in order to test Business Continuity planning and provided learning opportunities for staff. The Committee were satisfied that the Business Continuity management process was operating efficiently and effectively in identifying any issues.

Internal Audit - it was noted that although the resourced audit plan did not include a specific allocation of days for use by the Committee, there was an agreement between the CC and the PCC that the Committee may,

at its discretion, draw on up to 10 audit days for its own specific use. The Committee confirmed that they did not need to see this facility during 2019.

In July, the Committee received the Annual Report from the Chief Internal Auditor and of the 23 completed audits, 16 (70%) had received 'Reasonable' assurance and 7 (30%) had received 'Limited' assurance. The Committee confirmed that next year they wanted to see a trend shown over the last three years of how well the organisation was coping, i.e. the ratings provided for each audit. Ian Thompson (IT) noted that if the Committee wanted full assurance the organisation could select easier audits rather than more risky ones which would inevitably result in better audit ratings. The Committee stressed they were just trying to get a picture of how the organisation was moving forwards and to see where pressures lay and whether this was having an impact on good practices. (PH) commented that looking ahead, given that the development of the annual audit plan is based on a relatively consistent corporate risk assessment before individual audits are selected, when auditing reports are finalised each year, perhaps a track record over a few years could be built up to give an overall picture of 'averages' of limited assurance, reasonable assurance and full assurance that covered all the risks, rather than just the easier ones or the more difficult ones. Neil Shovell (NS) noted that producing trends was straight forward with a caveat and they did not undertake the same audits each year. Linda Waters (LW) indicated that the trend should separately identify financial and operational audits since this would give a far truer position. Amanda Cooper (AC) had approached this area in early January with (NS) and (AS) and wanted to maintain and continue this approach and felt the processes already in place for ICT were proactive and efficient in collecting data from CCMT. The Committee clarified that they were not questioning the relationship between CCMT and the Internal Auditors, it was simply that they wanted to see a trend over a few years.

In conclusion, the Committee were satisfied that the system of internal audit in Thames Valley was operating efficiently and effectively and there were not any specific issues or areas of concern that they wished to highlight at today's meeting.

External Audit - The Committee reiterated the good working relationship with EY, expressing their gratitude for their key role in the effective closedown and early audit sign-off process.

Health & Safety - The Committee were pleased to note the 12% drop in the total number of reported accidents and incidents and the 11% reduction in reported RIDDOR incidents compared to the previous financial year.

Inspection and Review - The Committee understood that the CC and his team had considered each of the HMICFRS reports in detail, irrespective of whether it related directly to Thames Valley Police and where appropriate, agreed an action plan. The Committee also noted that the PCC was required to consider and publish a report to each HMICFRS report that was relevant to TVP but that so far, no copies of the HMICFRS reports and responses of the PCC had been received by the Committee.

Action: (PH) to send a copy of the HMICFRS reports and the TVP and PCC responses to the Committee by way of an update.

The PCC noted that the HMICFRS inspection did not take into account the outcomes of crimes and had recently brought this to the attention of the Home Secretary as well as the Policing Minister. The Force had solved every homicide investigated this year but this had not been reported or heard. The reporting system changed frequently but it was up to the Home Office to sort any issues out.

Accountability Arrangements - The Committee reviewed, on an annual basis, its performance against its operating principles and reported the results of the review to the PCC and CC. However, the Committee had not formerly reviewed its effectiveness in 2019 but a review would take place next year.

In terms of oversight arrangements for Complaints, Integrity and Ethics, the Committee wanted to amend the second line of the second paragraph by changing the word 'ensure' to "assess" and adding the words '*since August 2019*' to the end of that sentence.

Action: (CR) to amend the Annual Assurance Report as per the Committee's request.

(MD) noted that in relation to the (PESP) meetings the challenge for the Committee as observers was the 'change in behaviour' rather than the change set out in the Terms of Reference.

(GW) asked whether the (PESP) members would be remaining or whether there would be any change. It was noted that the PCC and CC would be meeting to discuss various matters in relation to (PESP) in 2020.

Conclusion - The Committee finally noted that there had been constructive challenges over the past twelve months on a wide range of topics which had given the Committee greater access to information and meetings. The relationship was extremely positive both with the OPCC and TVP and their senior staff which had enabled the Committee to contribute to improved audits, risk management and internal controls. Given the significance of managing the 'People' risks for the success of TVP, the Committee would continue to keep this area in focus in years to come. However, based on the information that the Committee has seen collectively, or know about individually, it can assure the PCC and Chief Constable that the risk management and internal control environment in Thames Valley is operating efficiently and effectively.

Finally, the three long-standing Committee members of JIAC (Louis Lee, Richard Jones and Alison Phillips) would all be retiring in 2020 and hoped that capable replacements would be appointed by the PCC and CC. (MD) and (GW) would be staying on the Committee and expressed a wish that the recruitment process would take place sooner rather than later.

4. TVP RISK MANAGEMENT REPORT & BUSINESS CONTINUITY UPDATE

TVP Risk Management Report

The report contained updates for the period 1 September 2019 to 31 October 2019 where there were significant incidents to note. Over a 2 month period, many of the risk scores remained static with the exception of two ERP risks. The risk around abstraction in 2021/22 had been added to the Strategic Risk Register that the Committee requested, which took place at the September CCMT meeting.

Mark Horne (MH) reported to the Committee the main issues:

SR81 ESMCP Risks (page 43) - The technical risks had fallen significantly with contracts now in place for air to ground suppliers and the vehicle communications contract being finalised. However, some risks remained until final technical specifications had been agreed. As this was a complex project, it remained a significant risk to TVP and would therefore be monitored and reviewed regularly.

TVP were now identifying where additional costs may be incurred through further delay and an initial finding was that the delay would create a gap between the life of existing radios and the introduction of new ones which would create a new procurement exercise for a short term solution.

Gordon Woods (GW) asked whether this risk had now materialised as an issue. (JH) confirmed that this was correct. Every police force had been affected and all forces needed to pay for the cost themselves which could present an issue but were working with the Home Office on this issue. The implications for the future were still unknown at this stage and (MH) and (JH) confirmed that they would review this section and update it as and when further details arose.

SR78 ERP Risks (page 50) – The most significant change during this period had been the increase in the risk of a delay in ERP. The risk has returned to its original level after falling significantly in the last period. The project team recognised that the information provided to them in the last report leading to the risk falling, was not as accurate as they would have anticipated. After further input, they re-assessed the score back-up as the technical aspects of the project were not as far advanced as they had first been led to believe. Whilst this was unfortunate, risk could only be assessed based on the best information that was available at the time. This also meant that the risk of ERP failing, had slightly risen. Further detail around ERP would be provided later in today's meeting.

SR74 Recruitment and Retention (page 55) – With a continued growth in recruitment the risk continued to fall, although the organisation would not expect to see immediate improvements in retention rates. It was unlikely that the risk would fall further without improved retention rates. Additionally, the challenges from new entry routes into policing and the potential increase in officers, could impact on the organisation's ability to keep the risk score down. TVP would review and monitor this risk and give greater consideration to retention and entry routes in order to reflect this. Mike Day (MD) had noted that retention was as important as

recruitment and was glad to read the contents of this paragraph as this was also a very high priority. (JH) confirmed to the Committee that the Force had been awarded 183 officers up to March 2021 but were now 136 officers above strength which meant TVP was currently in a good place.

SR84 Future abstraction rates (page 60) - Tasking and Resilience identified that the new entry routes coupled with the moving of forty Police Officers into detective roles by April 2020 would have an impact on the numbers of deployable officers over the next three years. TVP were currently identifying realistic ways of reducing the impact of this. In the short-term, the organisation would expect this risk to remain fairly static until a solution had been agreed and the resulting numbers had been re-modelled. Currently, this risk was addressed through the Workforce Board and the Tier 1 Resourcing and Resilience meetings. The Committee noted that ACO Dr Steven Chase (SC) was the risk owner in SR84 and felt that (SC's) name should also be shown in the second 'owned by' column shown on page 61.

SR77 Released Under Investigation (page 64) – Whilst the organisation were showing 'red' against future actions as incomplete, this was not as serious as it looked. There were a number of strands of work that were still ongoing to deal with the issue however, TVP had initially placed unrealistic timelines on these complex areas of work and there was a need to split out the twelve strands to look at them individually and get a more nuanced view of progress. (MH) confirmed that this would be completed for the next report.

Action: In relation to RUI, (MH) would be updating this section prior to the next meeting splitting out the twelve strands to look at them individually.

SR75 CMP Delivery Delay (page 68) – The direction of travel up until very recently had suggested that CMP would be in the initial stages of full launch by this report. Unfortunately, due to synchronisation issues, the project team were not fully confident that CMP would hold up if there were increased demands and had taken the decision to complete further testing to ensure programme stability. The Strategic Governance Unit worked with Contact Management and Hampshire Constabulary to deliver business facing Business Continuity exercises and were confident that TVP would be able to manage issues around CMP failure. However, a live exercise environment running on the Isle of Wight had already taken place and all functionality was working well and CMP delivery was expected to be completed by the end of January 2020. The delay was caused by a period of demand exceeding contact management staff availability within Hampshire. This was due to an initial staffing gap increased by CMP training and secondments. Hampshire managed this issue through a Gold Group which recommended a staffing uplift although this had no impact on TVP.

Assurance levels

Although most risk owners were recording and sharing risk information, there were still some concerns about the effectiveness of capturing outcomes from actions and deadline slippage. While the organisation had assurances that there were action plans, they were less able to offer a full assurance that these actions were creating positive outcomes. At this stage, assurance levels remained unchanged but there was further work still to be done to embed outcome reporting into the risk process. The Strategic Governance Unit could offer further support to all risk owners and leads about how to best achieve this either through additional targeted workshops or one-to-one sessions.

New risks raised through programme boards (page 73)

The Strategic Governance Unit (SGU) identified risks within programme and project boards and local risk registers which may require additional input from CCMT.

- The EU Gold Group stood down the EU Strategic Co-ordinating group for TV/ Hampshire and Isle of Wight.
- There had been 5 Airwave outages since 1 September 2019. Contact Management Business Continuity plans had managed these effectively however, if there continued to be an increased level of Airwave outage it was likely that this would create greater risk to the public and officers. The organisation raised this for information at this stage although, it should be considered alongside the increased delay on ESMCP.
- TVP and Hampshire were working to agree a risk around data quality and it was hoped that a detailed risk would be ready for discussion early in the New Year.

- In terms of Crime Data Integrity (CDI), the SGU prepared an analysis for the Gold Group recommending that further work be completed to assess the full extent of the risk in this area and outlining any mitigating actions required.
- There had been movement on the Chronicle risk, which was linked to fleet insurance and how this may not be able to meet the 1 December 2019 deadline to upload all driver details to the new system. Chief Supt. Wong had negotiated an extension to the deadline for the 'go-live' and were now required to fulfil this requirement by 31 March 2020. The organisation had therefore re-planned a schedule for the middle of March 2020 and were looking at alternatives for how this could be managed before the Equip interface went forward and to do this in the most efficient way. Once further details had been received, the Committee would be updated. Discussions were also taking place with Equip around the requirements of the interface to ensure that decisions that were being made on the go-live data upload.

Future Risk work (page 74) - Having delivered introductory sessions and a risk session focussed on commercial risk with procurement to around forty officers and staff, the organisation were repeating the introduction to risk sessions next month and had thirty-four people signed up. The workshops had been well received and it was hoped that more would be delivered in the New Year.

TVP Business Continuity Update

Incidents (page 76) - In the period 1 September 2019 to 31 October 2019, two BCP incidents were reported. First was the incident at the Banbury Training Centre which had been reported at the last meeting. The repair works should be finished by the 31 January 2020. After which, 2-3 days would be required for the re-fitting of furniture, equipment and getting the service moved back in.

Just outside the reporting period, Aylesbury Station had lost the use of their 'front desk' for one day due to building works. This impacted on public facing services such as bail reporting.

Exercises

- There were five Business Continuity exercises delivered between 1 September 2019 and 31 October 2019. Most significant were the Milton Keynes scenario and testing linked to the business impact on the loss of CMP.

Milton Keynes looked at a full loss of the station and this had an impact both in the shorter and longer term. The exercise was supported by Property Services, ICT, Health & Safety as well as Procurement. The exercise demonstrated the impact of an event across all the areas based at Milton Keynes (including control rooms and custody). Overall, the exercise demonstrated that the teams based there had Business Continuity plans in place that allowed them to continue to deliver services to an acceptable level whilst planning longer term recovery.

The CMP exercise was delivered as part of a wider go-live process, and allowed the organisation to test the Contact Management business response to four scenarios of an overall loss of CMP, synchronisation issues, loss of mapping and a loss of communications. From a Business Continuity point of view, some updates and minor issues had been identified but from a TVP point of view, SGU felt confident that TVP Contact Management could deliver a positive business response without jeopardising public and officer safety in the short to medium term. A common lesson across both exercises and from the Corporate Comms exercise was the gap in internal comms in a large scale incident. Currently, this felt quite ad-hoc and there was a benefit of looking further into a more joined-up system that would improve internal message cascading.

ICT priority incidents (page 79) – Three P1 incidents occurred between 1 September 2019 and 31 October 2019 with the online reporting incidents reported at the last meeting. Both other incidents impacted on control rooms and both were linked to third party suppliers. In both cases, Networks had contacted BT to arrange further analysis of these incidents. No P1 incidents resulted in ICT invoking Business Continuity plans.

In the same period, twenty P2 incidents were reported. Again, many of these were linked to Command and Control issues, and as previously mentioned, five were linked to Airwave failures. Whilst Contact Management had robust Business Continuity plans in place, these issues would be continually monitored to

see if they increased, if there was a blip or the start of a trend. If the organisation was seeing a trend, then the Strategic Risk Register would need to reflect this. (AC) pointed out to the Committee that she had connected heavily with Ian Dyson who currently leads on Airwave and all data from TVP/Hampshire around outages showed some concerns. (AC) would also shortly be liaising with third party engineers in order to fix any issues with Open Reach and BT. There was now a formal strategic meeting that took place every quarter with BT and also a Silver Group meeting for any issues that BT were addressing with better responses from BT received. Additional meetings have also taken place with Vodafone to resolve any issues.

In relation to Data Quality work was still ongoing through the Data Governance Project and jointly with Hampshire to agree a risk around the quality of data available and its impact on both operational and strategic decision making across both forces. This was likely to be a complex risk with a variety of stakeholders. (LL) confirmed that it was nice to hear a significant culture change and thanked (AC) for her update.

(LL) referred to page 80 of the update and asked how much manual intervention and the number of days it took to retrieve reports that should have been online. Robert France (RF) confirmed that he did not know how many hours this took and was limited as to how far the organisation went into this as Contact Management dealt with this.

(RJ) confirmed that the Report was a useful summary with (RF) summarising data quality.

(LL) complimented the quality of the report and noted a comprehensive set of papers.

(MH) and (AP) left the meeting at 11:35am

5. OPCC RISK REGISTER & RISK MANAGEMENT UPDATE

(PH) reported on six ongoing and one new risk in the OPCC Risk Register.

- **OPCC18 Funding** – The strategic priorities set out in the current Police and Crime Plan would be delivered before the Plan expired and a new one put in place after the PCC elections in May 2020. The Police Grant figures for 2020/21 had not yet been released although funding had already been given for the recruitment of additional police officers so the OPCC was confident, even though there was a budget deficit that it would still be worked on, that the PCC's current strategic priorities would be delivered in full.
- **OPCC19 Demand for Victim Services** – This was the only risk that had showed an upward trend since the last meeting as the evidence of the number of referrals for support had increased. Whilst excess demand for victim services could be managed in the short term, any reduction in the quality and or quantity of service provided to victims could have consequences such as reputational damage for the PCC.
- **OPCC21 Specialist Counselling Service** – One concern the Committee had was that OPCC21 was not in fact a 'risk' but an 'issue'. (PH) confirmed that the wording had recently been changed on the Plan as previously indicated by the Committee. Since the last meeting, remedial action had been implemented, e.g. new referrals had been halted whilst issues were addressed; improvements made to the application process to ensure appropriate service was dealt with; session capping, and the OPCC had created a new post for a dedicated officer to manage the service. A routine follow-up internal audit review of all changes made would be undertaken in due course to provide assurance that all agreed management actions were being or had been implemented and system weaknesses had been successfully addressed.
- **OPCC23 New demands on OPCC** – PH summarised a number of recent changes and proposals affecting the responsibilities of PCCs, including the PCC taking on the role of a police appellate body which would come into effect in February 2020. In addition, proposals had also been put forward for PCCs to collate local criminal justice agencies' performance data, to be involved in future probation service arrangements and to act as a final arbitrator of local authority use of the 'community trigger'. The OPCC was monitoring these as just 'proposals' at this stage as some may or may not go ahead.

In terms of the potential impact of these proposals happening, frequent reviews were being carried out by management as to the nature of the roles and responsibilities that may be changed.

- **OPCC24 Specialist victims' services not in place before April 2020** – The tendering and selection process had now concluded and there was ongoing management discussion between the OPCC and the current and new service suppliers regarding transition arrangements. (PH) was confident that all would run well.
- **OPCC26 Safeguarding responsibilities in the Victims First Hub** – Enhanced staff training had been introduced and risk management policies had been reinforced with staff at the Hub.
- **OPCC27 New Risk –PCC acting ultra Vires** – (PH) noted that PCCs may have two sets of responsibilities in the role of PCC to discharge and undertake – as a local PCC serving the community of the Thames Valley in holding TVP to account and as a 'Portfolio Holder' acting on behalf of the Association of Police and Crime Commissioners (APCC) to develop relevant national policies on behalf of all PCCs. This increased the risk of a PCC undertaking an initiative which may be outside of the PCCs normal remit.

The Committee had several questions on the OPCC Risk Register. (MD) felt that in relation to OPCC21, the briefing was not currently apparent and wondered whether this was reactive or proactive. Was the OPCC better prepared for new responsibilities for the PCC and how could the Committee be reassured of this. (PH) noted that these were two different questions. The new national demands for the OPCC were notified in proposals in advance and discussed at internal Senior Management Meetings (SMG) and preparation would be based on the advice received from relevant national bodies. However, there had not been a situation whereby the TV OPCC had had to develop and implement a new local service 'from scratch' in isolation (e.g. the Victims First Hub and the Specialist Counselling Service) and develop the necessary service infrastructure and responsibilities in isolation, without the benefit of a national template or guidance. (PH) agreed that the Committee were in fact correct and the office could and should have been more proactive in testing the new service systems before implementation to ensure they were fit for purpose. (MD) wanted to hear how the Committee could be assured that all lessons had been learned and this would not happen again. (PH) agreed that this was a fair challenge by the Committee and referred to the follow-up audit that would be undertaken in due course.

In respect of Risk OPCC27, (LL) asked whether the new OPCC internal guidance note being developed was likely to be incorporated in the corporate governance arrangements applicable to the PCC (and TVP). (PH) confirmed that there was a joint Governance Advisory Group which reviewed and updated the Joint Corporate Governance Framework each year and, once endorsed by the PCC and Deputy PCC, (PH) would anticipate seeing the new guidance note as an annex to that document. Accordingly, if adopted as an annex, this guidance note would be presented to the Committee for consideration and comment prior to the PCC and Chief Constable approving the updated Joint Corporate Governance Framework.

In response to a query from members concerning the PCC's interest in and responsibilities for addressing fraud, (PH) clarified that when undertaking a Portfolio Holder role on behalf of the APCC, this additional responsibility was limited to developing national policy concerning fraud and did not add any statutory powers to the PCC in terms of, for example, get involved with or investigating individual fraud cases across the country, as that responsibility remained with the relevant respective local criminal justice agencies. Any national role did not add any statutory powers to the PCC as this was a voluntary, discretionary, role. For example, if a PCC was to utilise a national role to get involved inappropriately in an operational policing matter, this may result in a breach of The Policing Protocol Order which may then result in an issue that the monitoring officer is required to act upon. At this point the PCC (AS) expressed his view to the Committee that he was not prepared to approve or agree a document that may stop him from doing something that he felt he ought to do. (PH) clarified for the benefit of the Committee that he would be under a statutory duty, as the PCC's appointed monitoring officer, to act in the event of an actual or likely breach of the law, protocol or code of practice, irrespective of whether the draft OPCC guidance note and/or Joint Corporate Governance Framework has been approved by the PCC.

6. EY OUTLINE AUDIT PLAN

Suresh Patel (SP) from EY was pleased to confirm that in the Outline Audit Plan they would continue to carry out their responsibilities as auditors for the organisation and to provide the Committee with a basis to review their proposed audit approach and scope for the 2019/20 audit in accordance with the requirements of the Local Audit and Accountability Act 2014, the National Audit Office's 2015 Code of Audit Practice, the Statement of Responsibilities issued by Public Sector Audit Appointments (PSAA) Ltd, auditing standards and other professional requirements. A recent meeting had already taken place between EY, LW and IT and they looked forward to the future, working with the organisation.

Cheng Sha (CS) went through the overview of the 2019/20 audit strategy summarising the risks and details and area of audit focus set out on pages 107 and 108.

The timetable of communication and deliverables showed the key stages of the audit and the deliverables agreed for the audit cycle in 2019/20. From time to time matters could arise that required immediate communication with the PCC and CC, and EY would discuss these with the Joint Independent Audit Committee Chair as appropriate.

As to Value for Money, EY confirmed they would report back to the Committee in future meetings on any updates. The Value for Money conclusion was on arrangements in place rather than outcomes and the Committee would want a follow-up about realisation.

Set out on page 132 the Public Sector Audit Appointments Ltd (PSAA) had published the fee scale for the audit of the 2019/20 accounts of opted-in principal local government and police bodies.

(LL) thanked EY for their hard work and for their continued communications with (LW), (IT) and their respective teams.

7. PROGRESS ON 2019/20 INTERNAL AUDIT PLAN DELIVERY AND SUMMARY OF MATTERS ARISING FROM COMPLETED AUDITS

(NS) took the Committee through the main points set out in the report which provided details on the progress made in delivering the 2019/20 Joint Internal Audit Plan and the findings arising from the audit that had thus far been completed.

There had been no changes to the Joint Internal Audit Team's resource plan for 2019/20 with the plan delivered by the Chief Internal Auditor, Principal Auditor and TIAA Ltd (ICT audit provider). The progress made in delivering the 2019/20 Joint Internal Audit Plan as at 25 November 2019 was set out and detailed in Appendix A. There had been changes made to the plan since the previous JIAC meeting in October and (NS) commented on the Telematics Information and Reporting pilot scheme as well as Force Training Needs and the ongoing work within the People Directorate managing the officer uplift. These changes would be rolled into next year's plan and (NS) was content with the rationale to do this.

The only other changes had been some minor audit title updates and day allocation alterations.

As to the 2019/20 Performance Indicators, (NS) was happy the RAG statuses were all green.

Work on the 2018/19 NFI exercise was still ongoing. The data matches had been received and work was progressing to review this information. As at December 2019, there had been one issue that had been identified with regard to a declared business interest which had not been reviewed for appropriateness. This had since been addressed both in terms of the individual's interest and the wider process for reviewing such interests.

The Joint Internal Audit Team had liaised with the Professional Standards Department (PSD) and Corporate Finance and there had been no instances of fraud that needed to be notified to the team since the previous meeting.

Alison Phillips (AP) wanted it noted that she was content with the reassurances given on the vetting audit. There were good responses and several updates had been well received. (JH) felt confident that the three areas of those officers that had not been vetted, the backlog and issues with 'after care' within the force had all now been carried out. The good news was that vetting had been given additional resources to compensate for the additional work that had to be carried out and it was hoped that HMICFRS would see an improvement next year.

(MD) requested an update as to how to make sure there was proper visibility of the OPCC's risk. (PH) confirmed that internal OPCC Senior Officers Group (SOG) meetings and Senior Management Group (SMG) meetings (the latter involving the PCC and DPCC), both took place on a monthly basis and the PCC and DPCC were updated on any discussions concerning significant matters that had taken place during (SOG) meetings. More pertinent, Risk Management was now a standard agenda item at these meetings, together with monitoring of progress of internal audit report management actions and outcomes, and both of these items, in terms of risks and issues identified, informed the regular review and update of the OPCC Strategic Delivery Plan. These standard agenda items would help ensure all key issues that faced the OPCC would be identified and dealt with appropriately, as well as improving transparency and accountability to the PCC.

8. PROGRESS ON DELIVERY OF AGREED ACTIONS IN INTERNAL AUDIT REPORTS

The Report provided details of the progress made by managers in delivering the agreed actions in internal audit reports. There was currently reported 32 overdue actions which (AS) summarised to the Committee.

There were 14 Priority 1 overdue actions and details of these were set out in Appendix 1. There were 18 Priority 2 rated overdue actions although none were drawn to the attention of the Committee. (LL) did not wish to go through the Priority 1 and 2 actions and asked whether the actions had been copied to (SC) as his actions were still outstanding. (LL) asked whether CCMT members were taking these overdue actions seriously.

(RJ) commented that the graph on page 156 of Appendix 2 showed that the number of overdue actions had doubled in the previous two years and this was not a 'blip' and invited comments on how this had arisen and how it would be addressed. (JH) gave no excuses but noted that of the 16 reports covered in the list, there were 228 total actions and of those, 177 had now been completed and of the 32 overdue actions, 15% of the outstanding actions had also been completed. 85% were still being worked on and CCMT would continue monitoring this ensuring processes were put in place. (NS) and (AS) continued to meet with Cat Hemmings (CH) and other members of the team to put in place processes and confirmed that not all departments had processes but that visibility needed to be seen. (JH) asked for a list of all the departments that were not completing their outstanding actions and would follow this up but requested additional time to complete this.

9. DRAFT TREASURY MANAGEMENT STRATEGY STATEMENT 2020/21

The Committee had scrutinised the draft Treasury Management Strategy Statement (TMSS) and summary provided in readiness for this paper to go to the Level 1 meeting on 21 January 2020. The draft 2020/21 (TMSS) included the proposed borrowing and investment strategies and also set out the prudential indicators and treasury management activity limits for the period 2020/21 to 2022/23 that provided the OPCC treasury service with an operational performance and control framework within which the relevant functions were undertaken.

The strategy for 2020/21 covered two main areas:

Capital issues

- The capital plans and the prudential indicators; and
- The minimum revenue provision (MRP) strategy.

The CIPFA Code required the responsible officer to ensure that members with responsibility for treasury management received adequate training and applied especially to those members who were responsible for scrutiny. (IT) confirmed that the three new committee members would be given appropriate training.

The cost of borrowing from PWLB went up 1% overnight with no prior notice. (IT) hoped that the percentage increase would come down in the near future. The Committee had scrutinised the paper provided and were content for this helpful and comprehensive report to be presented at the Level 1 meeting in January 2020.

(GW) asked whether, overall, the Treasury Management Statement was very similar to other forces. (IT) reported that it would be. Rates dictated what TVP would do but moving forwards, more organisations were now having to borrow additional funds. (RJ) indicated that the paper had been written before the election and asked whether the economic forecast would be updated before the Level 1 meeting. (IT) confirmed that it would be.

Date of next meeting 16 March 2020 at 10.30am - The Conference Hall, TVP Headquarters South