



**OFFICE OF THE POLICE & CRIME COMMISSIONER FOR
THAMES VALLEY**

REPORT FOR DECISION: PCC 2018 – 003

Title: Treasury Management Strategy Statement 2018/19

Executive Summary:

This report presents the 2018/19 Treasury Management Strategy Statement for consideration and approval.

The Strategy Statement includes the proposed borrowing and investment strategies, and also sets out the prudential indicators and treasury management activity limits for the period 2018/19 to 2020/21 that provide the Office of the Police and Crime Commissioner's (OPCC) treasury service with an operational performance and control framework within which the relevant functions are undertaken.

The overall strategy is very similar to that adopted by the PCC in the current 2017/18 financial year.

The draft report was considered and endorsed by the Joint Independent Audit Committee at its recent meeting on 13th December 2017.

Recommendation:

The police and Crime Commissioner is asked to consider and APPROVE the Treasury Management Strategy Statement for 2018/19 incorporating the Minimum Revenue Provision Policy Statement and the Annual Investment Strategy

Police and Crime Commissioner

I hereby approve the recommendation above.

Signature

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to be "Alan...".

Date 30.1.18.

PART 1 – NON-CONFIDENTIAL

1 Introduction and background

- 1.1 The PCC is required to operate a balanced budget which broadly means that cash income raised during the year will meet cash expenditure. Part of the treasury management operation is to ensure that this cash flow is adequately planned with cash being available when it is needed. Surplus monies are invested in low risk counterparties or instruments commensurate with the PCC's low risk appetite, providing adequate liquidity initially before considering investment return.
- 1.2 The second main function of the treasury function is the funding of the PCC's capital investment plans. These capital plans provide a guide to the PCC's borrowing need, especially the longer term cash flow planning to ensure that the PCC can meet his capital spending obligations.

2 Issues for consideration

- 2.1 The attached Treasury Management Strategy Statement and supporting documents will enable the PCC to fulfil and discharge the following primary legislative requirements to receive and adopt:
- a) An over-arching annual **Treasury Management Strategy Statement** which sets out how the treasury service will support the PCC's capital investment decisions, the day to day treasury management and the limitations on activity through treasury prudential indicators.
 - b) A **Borrowing Strategy** which sets out the operational limits to borrowing activity, including the statutory Affordable Borrowing Limit, or 'Authorised Limit'.
 - c) An **Investment Strategy** which sets out the PCC's criteria for choosing investment counterparties and limiting exposure to the risk of loss.
 - d) A **Minimum Revenue Provision (MRP) Policy Statement** which sets out how the PCC will pay for capital assets through revenue each year.
 - e) Treasury management **Prudential Indicators and Activity Limits**, setting out the operational performance parameters applicable to the PCC's capital finance and treasury management activities.
- 2.2 The above policies and parameters will also provide an approved framework within which officers will undertake and account for the PCC's day-to-day capital and treasury activities.
- 2.3 The Committee needs to be satisfied that the draft Strategy is relevant and appropriate and, following approval in January 2018, will enable the PCC to discharge his statutory obligations in this key policy and financial management area.

3 Financial comments

- 3.1 The attached Treasury Management Strategy Statement is fully consistent with the draft revenue budget for 2018/19, the draft medium term financial plan (2018/19 to 2020/21) and the draft medium term capital plan as presented to the Level 1 public meeting on 16th November 2017. Any changes to the draft revenue budget or capital programme will inevitably mean changes to the capital, prudential and treasury management indicators before they are presented to the PCC for formal approval on 23rd January 2018.
- 3.2 The individual capital prudential indicators and the treasury management activity limits are clearly set out in the Statement, as is the annual borrowing and investment strategy.

4 Legal comments

- 4.1 The PCC is required to approve an annual treasury management and investment strategy. Quarterly monitoring reports will be provided directly to the PCC.

5 Equality comments

- 5.1 No specific implications arising from this report

6 Background papers

Link Asset Services draft Treasury Management Strategy Statement

Public access to information

Information in this form is subject to the Freedom of Information Act 2000 (FOIA) and other legislation. Part 1 of this form will be made available on the website within 1 working day of approval. Any facts and advice that should not be automatically available on request should not be included in Part 1 but instead on a separate Part 2 form. Deferment of publication is only applicable where release before that date would compromise the implementation of the decision being approved.

Is the publication of this form to be deferred? No

Is there a Part 2 form? No

Name & Role	Officer
Head of Unit This document is consistent with the draft annual revenue budget and draft capital programme. It also meets all the legal requirements set out below	PCC Chief Finance Officer
Legal Advice This document complies fully with the requirements of the Local Government Act 2003, the CIPFA Prudential Code, CLG Minimum Revenue Provision guidance, the CIPFA Treasury Management Code of Practice and CLG Investment Guidance.	Chief Executive
Financial Advice The draft Treasury Management Strategy Statement is fully consistent with the draft revenue budget and draft capital programme. Quarterly monitoring reports will be prepared and presented to the PCC	PCC Chief Finance Officer
Equalities & Diversity No specific implications arising from this report	Chief Executive

PCC's STATUTORY OFFICERS' APPROVAL

We have been consulted about the proposal and confirm that financial and legal advice have been taken into account in the preparation of this report.


We are satisfied that this is an appropriate request to be submitted to the Police and Crime Commissioner.


Chief Executive

Date 12 January 2018

Chief Finance Officer

Date 12 January 2018

The logo for the Police & Crime Commissioner Thames Valley. It features the text "POLICE & CRIME COMMISSIONER THAMES VALLEY" in a bold, dark grey, sans-serif font. The text is arranged in four lines: "POLICE", "& CRIME", "COMMISSIONER", and "THAMES VALLEY". To the right of the text is a large, blue, curved line that starts near the top right and curves downwards and to the left, ending near the bottom left, partially enclosing the text.

POLICE & CRIME COMMISSIONER THAMES VALLEY

Treasury Management Strategy Statement 2018/19

incorporating the Minimum Revenue Provision Policy
Statement and Annual Investment Strategy 2018/19

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1 INTRODUCTION

1.1 Background

The Police and Crime Commissioner (PCC) is required to operate a balanced budget, which broadly means that cash income raised during the year will meet cash expenditure. Part of the treasury management operation is to ensure that this cash flow is adequately planned, with cash being available when it is needed. Surplus monies are invested in low risk counterparties or instruments commensurate with the PCC's low risk policy and appetite, providing adequate liquidity initially before considering investment return.

The second main function of the treasury management service is the funding of the PCC's capital plans. These capital plans provide a guide to the PCC's borrowing need, essentially the longer term cash flow planning to ensure that the PCC can meet his capital spending obligations. This management of longer term cash may involve arranging long or short term loans, or using longer term cash flow surpluses. On occasion any debt previously drawn may be restructured to meet the PCC's risk or cost objectives.

The Chartered Institute of Public Finance and Accountancy (CIPFA) defines treasury management as:

"The management of the local authority's investments and cash flows, its banking, money market and capital market transactions; the effective control of the risks associated with those activities; and the pursuit of optimum performance consistent with those risks."

1.2 Reporting requirements

The PCC is required to receive and approve, as a minimum, three main reports each year, which incorporate a variety of policies, estimates and actuals.

Prudential and treasury indicators and treasury strategy (this report) - The first, and most important report covers:

- the capital plans (including prudential indicators);
- a minimum revenue provision (MRP) policy (how residual capital expenditure is charged to revenue over time);
- the treasury management strategy (how the investments and borrowings are to be organised) including treasury indicators; and
- an investment strategy (the parameters on how investments are to be managed).

A mid-year treasury management report – This will update the PCC with progress on the capital position, amending prudential indicators as necessary, and will indicate whether the treasury operation is meeting the strategy or whether any policies require revision. In addition, this PCC will receive quarterly update reports.

An annual treasury report – This provides details of a selection of actual prudential and treasury indicators and actual treasury operations compared to the estimates within the strategy.

Scrutiny

The above reports are required to be adequately scrutinised before being recommended to the PCC. As and when appropriate this role will be undertaken by the Joint Independent Audit Committee.

1.3 Treasury Management Strategy for 2018/19

The strategy for 2018/19 covers two main areas:

Capital issues

- the capital plans and the prudential indicators;
- the minimum revenue provision (MRP) strategy.

Treasury management issues

- the current treasury position;
- treasury indicators which limit the treasury risk and activities of the PCC;
- prospects for interest rates;
- the borrowing strategy;
- policy on borrowing in advance of need;
- debt rescheduling;
- the investment strategy;
- creditworthiness policy; and
- policy on use of external service providers.

These elements cover the requirements of the Local Government Act 2003, the CIPFA Prudential Code, CLG MRP Guidance, the CIPFA Treasury Management Code and CLG Investment Guidance.

1.4 Training

The CIPFA Code requires the responsible officer to ensure that members (*sic*) with responsibility for treasury management receive adequate training in treasury management. This especially applies to members (*sic*) responsible for scrutiny.

The PCC and all five members of the Joint Independent Audit Committee have been provided with appropriate training. Further training will be provided if required.

The training needs of treasury management staff are reviewed periodically.

1.5 Treasury management consultants

The Office of the PCC uses Link Asset Services as its external treasury management advisors.

The PCC recognises that responsibility for treasury management decisions remains with the organisation at all times and will ensure that undue reliance is not placed upon our external service providers.

The PCC also recognises that there is value in employing external providers of treasury management services in order to acquire access to specialist skills and resources. The PCC will ensure that the terms of their appointment and the methods by which their value will be assessed are properly agreed and documented, and subjected to regular review.

2 THE CAPITAL PRUDENTIAL INDICATORS 2016/17 – 2020/21

The PCC's capital expenditure plans are the key driver of treasury management activity. The output from the capital expenditure plans are reflected in prudential indicators.

2.1 Capital expenditure and financing

The PCC is asked to approve the summary capital expenditure and financing projections. Any shortfall in resources results in a funding borrowing need. This forms the first prudential indicator.

Table 1	2016/17	2017/18	2018/19	2019/20	2020/21
	Actual £m	Revised Estimate £m	Estimate £m	Estimate £m	Estimate £m
Capital Expenditure	26.063	30.145	26.484	20.961	17.416
Financed by:					
Capital receipts	14.664	13.401	9.014	3.530	3.435
Capital grants	2.543	1.058	13.279	1.513	0.000
Revenue Reserves	0.000	2.736	0.093	0.000	0.000
Revenue contributions	1.009	2.633	2.340	8.640	13.640
3 rd party contributions	0.212	0.668	0.150	0.150	0.150
Other Income	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000
Capital Reserves	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000
Improvement & Performance Reserve	0.000	9.649	1.493	0.000	0.000
Cashflow – timing issues ¹	0.000	0.000	0.115	7.128	- 4.809
Net financing need for the year	7.635	0.000	0.000	0.000	5.000

¹. If all capital expenditure is incurred as scheduled in the Medium term Capital Plan then we may not have sufficient capital resources in 2018/19 and 2019/20 to cover the expenditure as it is incurred. Should this situation arise, which is unlikely, we would use general balances or general cashflow until the capital resources are received e.g. from the sale of assets

2.2 The PCC's borrowing need (the Capital Financing Requirement)

The second prudential indicator is the PCC's Capital Financing Requirement (CFR). The CFR is simply the total historic outstanding capital expenditure which has not yet been paid for from either revenue or capital resources. It is essentially a measure of the PCC's underlying borrowing need. Any capital expenditure included in the table above, which has not immediately been paid for, will increase the CFR.

The CFR does not increase indefinitely, as the minimum revenue provision (MRP) is a statutory annual revenue charge which broadly reduces the borrowing need in line with each asset's life.

The CFR includes other long term liabilities such as PFI schemes and finance leases. Whilst these increase the CFR, and therefore the borrowing requirement, these types of scheme include a borrowing facility and so the PCC is not required to separately borrow for these schemes. The PCC currently [2017/18] has £5.739m of such schemes within the CFR.

The PCC is asked to approve the following CFR projections.

Table 2	2016/17 Actual £m	2017/18 Revised Estimate £m	2018/19 Estimate £m	2019/20 Estimate £m	2020/21 Estimate £m
Opening CFR	39.655	46.407	45.283	44.137	42.967
Net financing need for the year (per Table 1 above)	- 0.710	- 0.863	- 0.863	- 0.863	- 0.863
Net Borrowing	7.635	0.000	0.000	0.000	5.000
Less MRP/VRP and other financing movements	- 0.173*	- 0.261	- 0.283	- 0.307	- 0.332
Movement in CFR	6.752	-1.124	-1.146	-1.170	3.805
Closing CFR	46.407	45.283	44.137	42.967	46.772

*During 2016/17, an counting error in the PFI model was identified, which has been corrected. The overall result was to increase the liability outstanding to date by £0.079 million

2.3 Minimum revenue provision (MRP) policy statement

The PCC is required to pay off an element of the accumulated capital spend each year (the CFR) and make a statutory charge to revenue for the repayment of debt, known as the minimum revenue provision (MRP). The MRP policy sets out how the PCC will pay for capital assets through revenue each year. The PCC is also allowed to make additional voluntary payments (voluntary revenue provision - VRP).

CLG regulations have been issued which require the PCC to approve an MRP Statement in advance of each year. A variety of options are provided, so long as there is a prudent provision.

The PCC is recommended to approve the following MRP Statement:

- For capital expenditure incurred before 1 April 2008, MRP will be based on the Regulatory Method. MRP will be written down over a fixed 50 year period
- For capital expenditure incurred from 1 April 2008, the MRP will be based on the 'Asset Life Method', whereby MRP will be based on the estimated life of the assets in accordance with the regulations.
- For finance leases, an 'MRP equivalent' sum will be paid off each year.

2.4 Core funds and expected investment balances

Investments will be made with reference to the core balances, future cash flow requirements and the outlook for short-term interest rates (i.e. rates for investments up to 12 months).

Table 3 below provides an estimate of the year end balances for each resource and anticipated day to day cash flow balances.

Table 3	2016/17	2017/18	2018/19	2019/20	2020/21
Year End Resources	Actual £m	Estimate £m	Estimate £m	Estimate £m	Estimate £m
General balances	18.091	18.370	17.935	17.935	17.935
Earmarked revenue reserves	34.721	20.323	16.398	14.954	14.333
Capital grants and reserves	17.365	0.747	0.175	0.025	0.000
Insurance provision	7.006	8.080	8.080	8.080	8.080
Total core funds	77.183	47.520	42.588	40.994	40.348
Working capital*	5.600	5.600	5.600	5.600	5.600
Expected investments	82.783	53.120	48.188	46.594	45.948

* The working capital balance is the average difference between cash investments and core cash balances from the last 3 financial years. The actual figure will obviously vary from day to day according to circumstances.

2.5 Affordability prudential indicators

The previous sections cover the overall capital expenditure and control of borrowing prudential indicators but, within this framework, prudential indicators are required to assess the affordability of the capital investment plans. These provide an indication of the impact of the capital investment plans on the PCC's overall finances. The PCC is asked to approve the following indicators:

2.6 Ratio of financing costs to net revenue stream.

This indicator identifies the trend in the cost of capital (borrowing and other long term obligation costs net of investment income) against the net revenue stream. The estimates of financing costs include current commitments and the proposals in this budget report.

Table 4	2016/17	2017/18	2018/19	2019/20	2020/21
Ratio of Financing Costs to Net Revenue Stream	Actual %	Estimate %	Estimate %	Estimate %	Estimate %
Ratio	0.39	0.51	0.54	0.54	0.57

2.7 Incremental impact of capital investment decisions on PCC council tax.

This indicator is calculated by identifying those revenue costs which appear separately in the medium term financial plan (e.g. changes in DRF, capital financing costs and revenue consequences of capital investment) and then expressing those cash changes in terms of band D council tax.

Table 5	2017/18	2018/19	2019/20	2020/21
Impact of Capital Investment Decisions on PCC Council Tax	Estimate £	Estimate £	Estimate £	Estimate £
Band D council tax	1.92	5.01	8.38	4.92

3 BORROWING

The capital expenditure plans set out in Section 2 provide details of the service activities of the PCC. The treasury management function ensures that the PCC's cash is organised in accordance with the relevant professional codes so that sufficient cash is available to meet this service activity. This will involve both the organisation of the cash flow and, where capital plans require, the organisation of appropriate borrowing facilities. The strategy covers the relevant treasury / prudential indicators, the current and projected debt positions and the annual investment strategy.

3.1 Current portfolio position

The PCC's borrowing portfolio position at 31 March 2017, with forward projections, is summarised below. The table shows the actual external debt (the treasury management operations), against the underlying capital borrowing need (the Capital Financing Requirement or CFR), highlighting any over or under borrowing.

Table 6 PCC Borrowing Portfolio	2016/17 Actual %	2017/18 Estimate %	2018/19 Estimate %	2019/20 Estimate %	2020/21 Estimate %
External Debt					
Debt at 1 April	14.843	14.843	22.478	27.478	29.978
Expected change in Debt	0.000	7.635	5.000	2.500	12.240
Other long-term liabilities (OLTL) at 1 st April	5.980	5.739	5.478	5.195	4.888
Expected change in OLTL	-0.173	-0.261	-0.283	-0.307	-0.332
Actual gross debt at 31 March	20.650	27.956	32.673	34.866	46.774
The CFR	46.407	45.283	44.137	42.967	46.772
Under / (over) borrowing	25.757	17.327	11.464	8.101	-0.002

Within the prudential indicators there are a number of key indicators to ensure that the PCC operates their activities within well defined limits. One of these is that the PCC needs to ensure that their gross debt does not, except in the short term, exceed the total of the CFR in the preceding year plus the estimates of any additional CFR for 2018/19 and the following two financial years. This allows some flexibility for limited early borrowing for future years, but ensures that borrowing is not undertaken for revenue purposes.

The Chief Finance Officer reports that the PCC has complied with this prudential indicator in the current year and does not envisage difficulties for the future. This view takes into account current commitments, existing plans, and the proposals in this budget report.

3.2 Treasury Indicators: limits to borrowing activity

The **operational boundary** for external debt is based on 'probable' debt during the year and is a benchmark guide, not a limit. Actual debt could vary around this boundary for short periods during the year. It should act as a monitoring indicator to initiate timely action to ensure the statutory mandatory indicator (the 'Authorised Limit', per Table 8 below) is not breached inadvertently.

Table 7 Operational boundary	2017/18 Estimate	2018/19 Estimate	2019/20 Estimate	2020/21 Estimate
Debt	22.478	27.748	29.978	42.218
Other long term liabilities	5.739	5.478	5.195	4.888
Short Term liabilities	10.000	10.000	10.000	10.000
Total	38.217	43.226	45.173	57.106

The **authorised limit** for external debt is a key prudential indicator which provides control on the overall level of affordable borrowing. It represents a limit beyond which external debt is prohibited and needs to be set and/or revised by the PCC. It reflects the level of external debt which, whilst not necessarily desired, could be afforded in the short term, but is not sustainable in the longer term. This is the statutory limit determined under section 3 (1) of the Local Government Act 2003. The Government retains an option to control either the total of all local authority plans, or those of a specific authority (or PCC), although this power has not yet been exercised.

The PCC is asked to approve the following authorised limit:

Table 8 Authorised limit	2017/18	2018/19	2019/20	2020/21
Debt	42.478	47.748	49.978	62.218
Other long term liabilities	5.739	5.478	5.195	4.888
Short Term liabilities	10.000	10.000	10.000	10.000
Total	58.217	63.226	65.173	77.106

3.3 Prospects for interest rates¹

The PCC has appointed Link Asset Services as his treasury advisor and part of their service is to assist the PCC to formulate a view on borrowing interest rates. The following table and subsequent paragraphs give the Link forecast view.

Table 9	Bank Rate	PWLB Borrowing Rates (including certainty rate adjustment)		
		5 year	25 year	50 year
	%	%	%	%
Mar 2018	0.50	1.60	2.90	2.60
Jun 2018	0.50	1.60	3.00	2.70
Sep 2018	0.50	1.70	3.00	2.80
Dec 2018	0.75	1.80	3.10	2.90
Mar 2019	0.75	1.80	3.10	2.90
Jun 2019	0.75	1.90	3.20	3.00
Sep 2019	0.75	1.90	3.20	3.00
Dec 2019	1.00	2.00	3.30	3.10
Mar 2020	1.00	2.10	3.40	3.20
Jun 2020	1.00	2.10	3.50	3.30
Sep 2020	1.25	2.20	3.50	3.30
Dec 2020	1.25	2.30	3.60	3.40
Mar 2021	1.25	2.30	3.60	3.40

“As expected, the Monetary Policy Committee (MPC) delivered a 0.25% increase in Bank Rate at its meeting on 2nd November. This removed the emergency cut in August 2016 after the EU referendum. The MPC also gave forward guidance that

1. As of 15 January 2018

they expected to increase Bank rate only twice more by 0.25% by 2020 to end at 1.00%. The Link Asset Services forecast as above includes increases in Bank Rate of 0.25% in November 2018, November 2019 and August 2020.

The overall longer run trend is for gilt yields and PWLB rates to rise, albeit gently. It has long been expected, that at some point, there would be a more protracted move from bonds to equities after a historic long-term trend, over about the last 25 years, of falling bond yields. The action of central banks since the financial crash of 2008, in implementing substantial Quantitative Easing, added further impetus to this downward trend in bond yields and rising bond prices. Quantitative Easing has also directly led to a rise in equity values as investors searched for higher returns and took on riskier assets. The sharp rise in bond yields since the US Presidential election in November 2016 has called into question whether the previous trend may go into reverse, especially now the Fed. has taken the lead in reversing monetary policy by starting, in October 2017, a policy of not fully reinvesting proceeds from bonds that it holds when they mature.

Until 2015, monetary policy was focused on providing stimulus to economic growth but has since started to refocus on countering the threat of rising inflationary pressures as stronger economic growth becomes more firmly established. The Fed. has started raising interest rates and this trend is expected to continue during 2018 and 2019. These increases will make holding US bonds much less attractive and cause their prices to fall, and therefore bond yields to rise. Rising bond yields in the US are likely to exert some upward pressure on bond yields in the UK and other developed economies. However, the degree of that upward pressure is likely to be dampened by how strong or weak the prospects for economic growth and rising inflation are in each country, and on the degree of progress towards the reversal of monetary policy away from quantitative easing and other credit stimulus measures.

From time to time, gilt yields – and therefore PWLB rates - can be subject to exceptional levels of volatility due to geo-political, sovereign debt crisis and emerging market developments. Such volatility could occur at any time during the forecast period.

Economic forecasting remains difficult with so many external influences weighing on the UK. Our Bank Rate forecasts, (and also MPC decisions), will be liable to further amendment depending on how economic data and developments in financial markets transpire over the next year. Forecasts for average earnings beyond the three year time horizon will be heavily dependent on economic and political developments. Volatility in bond yields is likely to endure as investor fears and confidence ebb and flow between favouring relatively more “risky” assets i.e. equities, or the “safe haven” of government bonds.

The overall longer run trend is for gilt yields and PWLB rates to rise, albeit gently. A world economic recovery will likely see investors switching from the safe haven of bonds to equities.

We have pointed out consistently that the Fed. Rate is likely to go up more quickly and more strongly than Bank Rate in the UK. While there is normally a high degree of correlation between the yields of gilts and treasuries in the UK and US respectively, we would expect to see a growing decoupling of yields between the two i.e. we would expect US bond yields to go up faster than UK yields. We will need to monitor this area closely and any resulting effect on PWLB rates.

The overall balance of risks to economic recovery in the UK is probably to the downside, particularly with the current level of uncertainty over the final terms of Brexit.

The balance of risks to increases in Bank Rate and shorter term PWLB rates are probably to the upside, and are dependent on how strong GDP growth turns out, how quickly inflation pressures rise, and how quickly the Brexit negotiations move forward positively.

Our forecasts are predicated on an assumption that there is no break-up of the Eurozone or EU, (apart from the departure of the UK), within our forecasting time period, despite the major challenges that are looming up, and that there are no major ruptures in international relations, especially between the US and China / North Korea, which have a major impact on international trade and world GDP growth.

We would, as always, remind clients of the view that we have expressed in our previous interest rate revision newsflashes of just how unpredictable PWLB rates and bond yields are at present. Our revised forecasts are based on the Certainty Rate (minus 20 bps), which has been accessible to most authorities since 1st November 2012.

Downside risks to current forecasts for UK gilt yields and PWLB rates currently include:

- Bank of England takes action too quickly over the next three years to raise Bank Rate and causes UK economic growth, and increases in inflation, to be weaker than we currently anticipate.
- Geopolitical risks, especially North Korea, but also in Europe and the Middle East, which could lead to increasing safe haven flows.
- A resurgence of the Eurozone sovereign debt crisis, possibly Italy, due to its high level of government debt, low rate of economic growth and vulnerable banking system.
- Weak capitalisation of some European banks.
- Germany is still without an effective government after the inconclusive result of the general election in October. In addition, Italy is to hold a general election on 4 March and the anti EU populist Five Star party is currently in the lead in the polls, although it is unlikely to get a working majority on its own. Both situations could pose major challenges to the overall leadership and direction of the EU as a whole and of the individual respective countries.
- The result of the October 2017 Austrian general election has resulted in a strongly anti-immigrant coalition government. In addition, the Czech ANO party became the largest party in the October 2017 general election on a platform of being strongly against EU migrant quotas and refugee policies. Both developments could provide major impetus to other, particularly former Communist bloc countries, to coalesce to create a major obstacle to progress on EU integration and centralisation of EU policy. This, in turn, could spill over into impacting the euro, EU financial policy and financial markets.
- Rising protectionism under President Trump
- A sharp Chinese downturn and its impact on emerging market countries

The potential for upside risks to current forecasts for UK gilt yields and PWLB rates, especially for longer term PWLB rates include: -

- The Bank of England is too slow in its pace and strength of increases in Bank Rate and, therefore, allows inflation pressures to build up too strongly within the UK economy, which then necessitates a later rapid series of increases in Bank Rate faster than we currently expect.
- UK inflation returning to sustained significantly higher levels causing an increase in the inflation premium inherent to gilt yields.
- The Fed causing a sudden shock in financial markets through misjudging the pace and strength of increases in its Fed. Funds Rate and in the pace and strength of reversal of quantitative easing, which then leads to a fundamental reassessment by investors of the relative risks of holding bonds, as opposed to equities. This could lead to a major flight from bonds to equities and a sharp increase in bond yields in the US, which could then spill over into impacting bond yields around the world.”

Investment and borrowing rates

- Investment returns are likely to remain low during 2018/19 but to be on a gently rising trend over the next few years.
- Borrowing interest rates increased sharply after the result of the general election in June and then also after the September MPC meeting when financial markets reacted by accelerating their expectations for the timing of Bank Rate increases. Apart from that, there has been little general trend in rates during the current financial year. The policy of avoiding new borrowing by running down spare cash balances has served well over the last few years. However, this needs to be carefully reviewed to avoid incurring higher borrowing costs in the future when authorities may not be able to avoid new borrowing to finance capital expenditure and/or the refinancing of maturing debt;
- There will remain a cost of carry to any new long-term borrowing that causes a temporary increase in cash balances as this position will, most likely, incur a revenue cost – the difference between borrowing costs and investment returns.

3.4 Borrowing strategy

The PCC is currently maintaining an under-borrowed position. This means that the capital borrowing need (the Capital Financing Requirement) has not been fully funded with loan debt as cash supporting the PCC's reserves, balances and cash flow has been used as a temporary measure. This strategy is prudent as, currently, investment returns are low and counterparty risk is still an issue that needs to be considered.

Against this background and the risks within the economic forecast, caution will be adopted with the 2018/19 treasury operations. The Chief Finance Officer will monitor interest rates in financial markets and adopt a pragmatic approach to changing circumstances, e.g.:

- *if it was felt that there was a significant risk of a sharp FALL in long and short term rates (e.g. due to a marked increase of risks around relapse into recession or of risks of deflation), then long term borrowings will be postponed, and potential rescheduling from fixed rate funding into short term borrowing will be considered.*

- if it was felt that there was a significant risk of a much sharper RISE in long and short term rates than that currently forecast, perhaps arising from an acceleration in the start date and in the rate of increase in central rates in the USA and UK, an increase in world economic activity or a sudden increase in inflation risks, then the portfolio position will be re-appraised. Most likely, fixed rate funding will be drawn whilst interest rates are lower than they are projected to be in the next few years.

Any urgent decisions taken by the Chief Finance Officer will be reported to the PCC at the next available opportunity.

For budget planning purposes we have included £5.000m of borrowing in 2018/19, and that additional loans of £2.500m in 2019/20 and £12.240m in 2020/21 will be taken out in order to reduce the current level of under-borrowing. This is important given the plans currently in place to utilise a significant proportion of the currently held revenue and capital reserves in coming years to help support one-off expenditure initiatives, including investment in new technology and change programmes.

At this stage we are planning to borrow £5m in 2020/21 to help fund long-term property initiatives in the Medium Term Capital Plan (2018/19 to 2020/21).

Adopting this approach will mean that the level of under-borrowing will fall from its current (31st March 2017) level of £25.757m to nil by the end of 2020/21, due to the statutory annual transfer of monies from the revenue account (i.e. the Minimum Revenue Provision) that will reduce the CFR, all other things remaining equal.

Treasury management limits on activity

There are three debt related treasury activity limits. The purpose of these are to restrain the activity of the treasury function within certain limits, thereby managing risk and reducing the impact of any adverse movement in interest rates. However, if these are set to be too restrictive they will impair the opportunities to reduce costs / improve performance. The indicators are:

- Upper limits on variable interest rate exposure. This identifies the maximum limit for variable interest rates for both borrowing and investments.
- Upper limits on fixed interest rate exposure. This is similar to the previous indicator and covers a maximum limit on fixed interest rates;
- Maturity structure of borrowing. These gross limits are set to reduce the PCC's exposure to large fixed rate sums falling due for refinancing, and are required for upper and lower limits.

The PCC is asked to approve the following treasury indicators and limits:

Table 10	2018/19	2019/20	2020/21
Interest rate exposures			
	Upper	Upper	Upper
<i>Limits on fixed interest rates:</i>			
• Debt only	100%	100%	100%
• Investments only	100%	100%	100%
<i>Limits on variable interest rates</i>			
• Debt only	50%	50%	50%
• Investments only	100%	100%	100%

Maturity structure of fixed interest rate borrowing 2018/19

	Lower	Upper
Under 12 months	0%	50%
12 months to 2 years	0%	50%
2 years to 5 years	0%	50%
5 years to 10 years	0%	50%
10 years and above	0%	100%
Maturity structure of variable interest rate borrowing 2018/19		
	Lower	Upper
<i>Under 12 months</i>	<i>0%</i>	<i>100%</i>
<i>12 months to 2 years</i>	<i>0%</i>	<i>100%</i>
<i>2 years to 5 years</i>	<i>0%</i>	<i>100%</i>
<i>5 years to 10 years</i>	<i>0%</i>	<i>100%</i>
<i>10 years and above</i>	<i>0%</i>	<i>100%</i>

3.5 Policy on borrowing in advance of need

The PCC will not borrow more than or in advance of its needs purely in order to profit from the investment of the extra sums borrowed. Any decision to borrow in advance will be within forward approved Capital Financing Requirement estimates, and will be considered carefully to ensure that value for money can be demonstrated and that the PCC can ensure the security of such funds.

3.6 Debt rescheduling

As short term borrowing rates will be considerably cheaper than longer term fixed interest rates, there may be potential opportunities to generate savings by switching from long term debt to short term debt. However, these savings will need to be considered in the light of the current treasury position and the size of the cost of debt repayment (premiums incurred).

The reasons for any rescheduling to take place will include:

- the generation of cash savings and / or discounted cash flow savings;
- helping to fulfil the treasury strategy;
- enhance the balance of the portfolio (amend the maturity profile and/or the balance of volatility).

Any rescheduling undertaken will be formally reported to the PCC in the next quarterly performance update.

4 ANNUAL INVESTMENT STRATEGY

4.1 Investment policy

The PCC's investment policy has regard to the CLG's Guidance on Local Government Investments ("the Guidance") and the revised CIPFA Treasury Management in Public Services Code of Practice and Cross Sectoral Guidance Notes ("the CIPFA TM Code"). The PCC's investment priorities will be security first, liquidity second, then return.

In accordance with the above guidance from the CLG and CIPFA, and in order to minimise the risk to investments, the PCC applies minimum acceptable credit criteria in order to generate a list of highly creditworthy counterparties which also enables

diversification and thus avoidance of concentration risk. The key ratings used to monitor counterparties are the Short Term and Long Term ratings.

Ratings will not be the sole determinant of the quality of an institution; it is important to continually assess and monitor the financial sector on both a micro and macro basis and in relation to the economic and political environments in which institutions operate. The assessment will also take account of information that reflects the opinion of the markets. To this end the PCC will engage with its advisors to maintain a monitor on market pricing such as “credit default swaps” and overlay that information on top of the credit ratings.

Other information sources used will include the financial press, share price and other such information pertaining to the banking sector in order to establish the most robust scrutiny process on the suitability of potential investment counterparties.

Investment instruments identified for use in the financial year are listed in appendix 5.2 under the ‘specified’ and ‘non-specified’ investments categories. Counterparty limits will be as set through the Council’s treasury management practices – schedules.

4.2 Creditworthiness policy

The PCC applies the creditworthiness service provided by Link Asset Services. This service employs a sophisticated modelling approach utilising credit ratings from the three main credit rating agencies - Fitch, Moody’s and Standard and Poor’s. The credit ratings of counterparties are supplemented with the following overlays:

- credit watches and credit outlooks from credit rating agencies;
- CDS spreads to give early warning of likely changes in credit ratings;
- sovereign ratings to select counterparties from only the most creditworthy countries.

This modelling approach combines credit ratings, credit Watches and credit Outlooks in a weighted scoring system which is then combined with an overlay of CDS spreads for which the end product is a series of colour coded bands which indicate the relative creditworthiness of counterparties. These colour codes are used by the PCC to determine the suggested duration for investments. The PCC will therefore use counterparties within the following durational bands.

- Yellow 5 years
- Purple 2 years
- Blue 1 year (only applies to nationalised or semi nationalised UK Banks)
- Orange 1 year
- Red 6 months
- Green 100 days
- No colour not to be used

Y	Pi1	Pi2	P	B	O	R	G	N/C
1	1.25	1.5	2	3	4	5	6	7
Up to 5yrs	Up to 5yrs	Up to 5yrs	Up to 2yrs	Up to 1yr	Up to 1yr	Up to 6mths	Up to 100days	No Colour

The Link Asset Services’ creditworthiness service uses a wider array of information than just primary ratings. Furthermore, by using a risk weighted scoring system, it does not give undue preponderance to just one agency’s ratings.

Typically the minimum credit ratings criteria the PCC uses will be a Short Term rating (Fitch or equivalents) of F1 and a Long Term rating of A-. There may be occasions when the counterparty ratings from one rating agency are marginally lower than these ratings but may still be used. In these instances consideration will be given to the whole range of ratings available, or other topical market information, to support their use.

All credit ratings will be monitored weekly. The PCC is alerted to changes to ratings of all three agencies through its use of the Link Asset Services' creditworthiness service:

- if a downgrade results in the counterparty / investment scheme no longer meeting the PCC's minimum criteria, its further use as a new investment will be withdrawn immediately.
- in addition to the use of credit ratings the PCC will be advised of information in movements in credit default swap spreads against the iTraxx benchmark and other market data on a daily basis via its Passport website, provided exclusively to it by Link Asset Services. Extreme market movements may result in downgrade of an institution or removal from the PCC's lending list.

Sole reliance will not be placed on the use of this external service. In addition the PCC will also use market data and market information, information on any external support for banks to help support its decision making process.

4.3 Country limits

The PCC has determined that it will only use approved counterparties from countries with a minimum sovereign credit rating of AA- from Fitch (or equivalent). The list of countries that qualify using this credit criteria as at the date of this report are shown in Appendix 5.3. This list will be added to, or deducted from, by officers should ratings change in accordance with this policy.

The UK is excluded from any stipulated minimum sovereign rating requirement.

4.4 Investment strategy

Investments will be made with reference to the core balance and cash flow requirements and the outlook for short-term interest rates (i.e. rates for investments up to 12 months). The majority of funds will be placed in call accounts, money market funds or short-term deposits. Alternatively, tradable certificates of deposit (CDs) will be acquired.

Investments of up to 2 years will also be allowed with the Royal Bank of Scotland Group. No material change in Government ownership is expected during that period. This policy will allow the PCC to lock in potential investment returns whilst continuing to adopt a low risk approach.

Bank Rate is forecast to rise steadily up to 1.25% by quarter 4 2020/21. Bank Rate forecasts for financial year ends (March) are:

- 2017/18 0.50%
- 2018/19 0.75%

- 2019/20 1.00%
- 2020/21 1.25%

The suggested budgeted investment earnings rates for returns on investments placed for periods up to 100 days during each financial year are as follows:

	Now
2017/18	0.40%
2018/19	0.60%
2019/20	0.90%
2020/21	1.25%
2021/22	1.50%
2022/23	1.75%
2023/24	2.00%
Later years	2.75%

The overall balance of risks to these forecasts is currently probably skewed to the upside and are dependent on how strong GDP growth turns out, how quickly inflation pressures rise and how quickly the Brexit negotiations move forward positively.

Investment treasury indicator and limit - total principal funds invested for greater than 364 days. These limits are set with regard to the PCC's liquidity requirements and to reduce the need for early sale of an investment, and are based on the availability of funds after each year-end. A limit of £20m is recommended in order to provide officers with flexibility to take advantage of time and cash limited offers, which sometimes exceed 364 days when initially offered, or to place deposits for up to 2 years in order to lock in investments returns whilst continuing to adopt a low risk approach.

The PCC is asked to approve the treasury indicator and limit:

Table 11 - Maximum principal sums invested > 364 days			
	2018/19	2019/20	2020/21
Principal sums invested	£20m	£20m	£20m

4.5 Investment risk benchmarking

The PCC has approved benchmarks for investment Security, Liquidity and Yield.

These benchmarks are simple guideline targets (not limits) and so may be breached from time to time, depending on movements in interest rates and counterparty criteria. The purpose of the benchmark is that officers will monitor the current and trend position, and amend the operational strategy depending on any changes.

The proposed benchmarking targets for 2018/19 are set out below:

- Security** - the PCC's maximum security risk benchmark for the current portfolio, when compared to historic default tables, is:
 - 0.25% historic risk of default when compared to the whole portfolio.
- Liquidity** – in respect of this area the OPCC seeks to maintain:
 - Bank overdraft limit - £0.1m
 - Liquid short term deposits - including the receipt of government grants, council tax precept income and use of short-term borrowing - of at least £5m available within one week.

- 'Weighted Average Life' benchmark - 9 months (270 days), with a maximum of 2 years.
- c) **Yield** – performance target is to achieve:
- an average return above the weighted average 7 day and 12 month LIBID rates (i.e. the bespoke TVP benchmark)

Any breach of the indicators or limits will be reported to the PCC, with supporting reasons, in the quarterly performance monitoring reports. Members of the Joint Independent Audit Committee will also be notified.

4.6 End of year investment report

At the end of the financial year the Chief Finance Officer will report on the investment activity as part of his Annual Treasury Report.

5 Appendices

5.1 Economic background (as provided by Link on 15.01.2018)

GLOBAL OUTLOOK. World growth looks to be on an encouraging trend of stronger performance, rising earnings and falling levels of unemployment. In October, the IMF upgraded its forecast for world growth from 3.2% to 3.6% for 2017 and 3.7% for 2018.

In addition, **inflation prospects are generally muted** and it is particularly notable that **wage inflation** has been subdued despite unemployment falling to historically very low levels in the UK and US. This has led to many comments by economists that there appears to have been a fundamental shift downwards in the Phillips curve (this plots the correlation between levels of unemployment and inflation e.g. if the former is low the latter tends to be high). In turn, this raises the question of what has caused this? The likely answers probably lay in a combination of a shift towards flexible working, self-employment, falling union membership and a consequent reduction in union power and influence in the economy, and increasing globalisation and specialisation of individual countries, which has meant that labour in one country is in competition with labour in other countries which may be offering lower wage rates, increased productivity or a combination of the two. In addition, technology is probably also exerting downward pressure on wage rates and this is likely to grow with an accelerating movement towards automation, robots and artificial intelligence, leading to many repetitive tasks being taken over by machines or computers. Indeed, this is now being labelled as being the start of the **fourth industrial revolution**.

KEY RISKS - central bank monetary policy measures

Looking back on nearly ten years since the financial crash of 2008 when liquidity suddenly dried up in financial markets, it can be assessed that central banks' monetary policy measures to counter the sharp world recession were successful. The key monetary policy measures they used were a combination of lowering central interest rates and flooding financial markets with liquidity, particularly through unconventional means such as Quantitative Easing (QE), where central banks bought large amounts of central government debt and smaller sums of other debt.

The key issue now is that that period of stimulating economic recovery and warding off the threat of deflation is coming towards its close and a new period has already started in the US, and more recently, in the UK, on reversing those measures i.e. by raising central rates and (for the US) reducing central banks' holdings of government and other debt. These measures are now required in order to stop the trend of an on-going reduction in spare capacity in the economy, and of unemployment falling to such low levels that the re-emergence of inflation is viewed as a major risk. It is, therefore, crucial that central banks get their timing right and do not cause shocks to market expectations that could destabilise financial markets. In particular, a key risk is that because QE-driven purchases of bonds drove up the price of government debt, and therefore caused a sharp drop in income yields, this then also encouraged investors into a search for yield and into investing in riskier assets such as equities. This resulted in bond markets and equity market prices both rising to historically high valuation levels simultaneously. This, therefore, makes both asset categories vulnerable to a sharp correction. It is important, therefore, that central banks only gradually unwind their holdings of bonds in order to prevent destabilising the financial markets. It is also likely that the timeframe for central banks unwinding their holdings of QE debt purchases will be over several years. They need to balance their timing to either squash economic recovery by taking too rapid and too strong action or, alternatively, let inflation run away by taking action that was too slow

and/or too weak. **The potential for central banks to get this timing and strength of action wrong are now key risks.**

There is also a potential key question over whether economic growth has become too dependent on strong central bank stimulus and whether it will maintain its momentum against a backdrop of rising interest rates and the reversal of QE. In the UK, a key vulnerability is the **low level of productivity growth**, which may be the main driver for increases in wages; and **decreasing consumer disposable income**, which is important in the context of consumer expenditure primarily underpinning UK GDP growth.

A further question that has come to the fore is whether **an inflation target for central banks of 2%**, is now realistic given the shift down in inflation pressures from internally generated inflation, (i.e. wage inflation feeding through into the national economy), given the above mentioned shift down in the Phillips curve.

- Some economists favour a shift to a **lower inflation target of 1%** to emphasise the need to keep the lid on inflation. Alternatively, it is possible that a central bank could simply 'look through' tepid wage inflation, (i.e. ignore the overall 2% inflation target), in order to take action in raising rates sooner than might otherwise be expected.
- However, other economists would argue for a **shift UP in the inflation target to 3%** in order to ensure that central banks place the emphasis on maintaining economic growth through adopting a slower pace of withdrawal of stimulus.
- In addition, there is a strong argument that central banks should **target financial market stability**. As mentioned previously, bond markets and equity markets could be vulnerable to a sharp correction. There has been much commentary, that since 2008, QE has caused massive distortions, imbalances and bubbles in asset prices, both financial and non-financial. Consequently, there are widespread concerns at the potential for such bubbles to be burst by exuberant central bank action. On the other hand, too slow or weak action would allow these imbalances and distortions to continue or to even inflate them further.
- Consumer debt levels are also at historically high levels due to the prolonged period of low cost of borrowing since the financial crash. In turn, this cheap borrowing has meant that **other non-financial asset prices**, particularly house prices, have been driven up to very high levels, especially compared to income levels. Any sharp downturn in the availability of credit, or increase in the cost of credit, could potentially destabilise the housing market and generate a sharp downturn in house prices. This could then have a destabilising effect on consumer confidence, consumer expenditure and GDP growth. However, no central bank would accept that it ought to have responsibility for specifically targeting house prices.

UK. After the UK economy surprised on the upside with strong growth in 2016, growth in 2017 was disappointingly weak in the first half of the year; quarter 1 came in at only +0.3% (+1.7% y/y) and quarter 2 was +0.3% (+1.5% y/y), which meant that growth in the first half of 2017 was the slowest for the first half of any year since 2012. The main reason for this has been the sharp increase in inflation, caused by the devaluation of sterling after the referendum, feeding increases in the cost of imports into the economy. This has caused, in turn, a reduction in consumer disposable income and spending power and so the services sector of the economy, accounting for around 75% of GDP, has seen weak growth as consumers cut back on their expenditure.

However, growth picked up in quarter 3 to 0.4% and in quarter 4 there have been encouraging statistics from the manufacturing sector which is seeing strong growth, particularly as a result of increased demand for exports. It has helped that growth in the EU, our main trading partner, has improved significantly over the last year. However, this

sector only accounts for around 10% of GDP so expansion in this sector will have a much more muted effect on the average total GDP growth figure for the UK economy as a whole. Growth in quarter 4 is expected to be around 0.4% again which would see annual growth in 2017 coming in at around 1.7 – 1.8%, almost as strong as the recently upwardly revised figure for 2016 of 1.8%, (which meant that the UK was equal to Germany as having the strongest GDP growth figure for the G7 countries in 2016).

While the Bank of England is expected to give forward guidance to prepare financial markets for gradual changes in policy, the **Monetary Policy Committee (MPC), meeting of 14 September 2017** managed to shock financial markets and forecasters by suddenly switching to a much more aggressive tone in terms of its words around warning that Bank Rate will need to rise soon. The Bank of England Inflation Reports during 2017 have clearly flagged up that it expected CPI inflation to peak at just under 3% in 2017, before falling back to near to its target rate of 2% in two years' time. The Bank revised its forecast for the peak to just over 3% at the 14 September meeting. (Inflation actually came in at 3.1% in November so that may prove now to be the peak.) This marginal revision in the Bank's forecast can hardly justify why the MPC became so aggressive with its wording; rather, the focus was on an emerging view that with unemployment having already fallen to only 4.3%, the lowest level since 1975, and improvements in productivity being so weak, that **the amount of spare capacity in the economy was significantly diminishing** towards a point at which they now needed to take action. In addition, the MPC took a more tolerant view of low wage inflation as this now looks like a common factor in nearly all western economies as a result of automation and globalisation. However, the Bank was also concerned that the withdrawal of the UK from the EU would effectively lead to a *decrease* in such globalisation pressures in the UK, and so this would cause additional inflationary pressure over the next few years.

At its 2 November meeting, the MPC duly delivered a 0.25% increase in Bank Rate. It also gave forward guidance that they expected to increase Bank Rate only twice more in the next three years to reach 1.0% by 2020. This is, therefore, not quite the 'one and done' scenario but is, nevertheless, a very relaxed rate of increase prediction in Bank Rate in line with previous statements that Bank Rate would only go up very gradually and to a limited extent.

However, some forecasters are flagging up that they expect growth to accelerate significantly towards the end of 2017 and then into 2018. This view is based primarily on the coming fall in inflation, (as the effect of the effective devaluation of sterling after the EU referendum drops out of the CPI statistics), which will bring to an end the negative impact on consumer spending power. In addition, a strong export performance will compensate for weak services sector growth. If this scenario was indeed to materialise, then the MPC would be likely to accelerate its pace of increases in Bank Rate during 2018 and onwards.

It is also worth noting the **contradiction within the Bank of England** between action in 2016 and in 2017 **by two of its committees**. After the shock result of the EU referendum, the **Monetary Policy Committee (MPC)** voted in August 2016 for emergency action to cut Bank Rate from 0.50% to 0.25%, restarting £70bn of QE purchases, and also providing UK banks with £100bn of cheap financing. The aim of this was to lower borrowing costs, stimulate demand for borrowing and thereby increase expenditure and demand in the economy. The MPC felt this was necessary in order to ward off their expectation that there would be a sharp slowdown in economic growth. Instead, the economy grew robustly, although the Governor of the Bank of England strongly maintained that this was *because* the MPC took that action. However, other commentators regard this emergency action by the MPC as being proven by events to be a mistake. Then in 2017, we had the **Financial Policy Committee (FPC)** of the Bank of England taking action in June and September over its concerns that cheap borrowing

rates, and easy availability of consumer credit, had resulted in too rapid a rate of growth in consumer borrowing and in the size of total borrowing, especially of unsecured borrowing. It, therefore, took punitive action to clamp down on the ability of the main banks to extend such credit! Indeed, a PWC report in October 2017 warned that credit card, car and personal loans and student debt will hit the equivalent of an average of £12,500 per household by 2020. However, averages belie wide variations in levels of debt with much higher exposure being biased towards younger people, especially the 25 - 34 year old band, reflecting their lower levels of real income and asset ownership.

One key area of risk is that consumers may have become used to cheap rates since 2008 for borrowing, especially for mortgages. It is a major concern that **some consumers may have over extended their borrowing** and have become complacent about interest rates going up after Bank Rate had been unchanged at 0.50% since March 2009 until falling further to 0.25% in August 2016. This is why forward guidance from the Bank of England continues to emphasise slow and gradual increases in Bank Rate in the coming years. However, consumer borrowing is a particularly vulnerable area in terms of the Monetary Policy Committee getting the pace and strength of Bank Rate increases right - without causing a sudden shock to consumer demand, confidence and thereby to the pace of economic growth.

Moreover, while there is so much uncertainty around the Brexit negotiations, consumer confidence, and business confidence to spend on investing, it is far too early to be confident about how the next two to three years will actually pan out.

EZ. Economic growth in the EU, (the UK's biggest trading partner), had been lack lustre for several years after the financial crisis despite the ECB eventually cutting its main rate to -0.4% and embarking on a massive programme of QE. However, growth picked up in 2016 and has now gathered substantial strength and momentum thanks to this stimulus. GDP growth was 0.6% in quarter 1 (2.1% y/y), 0.7% in quarter 2 (2.4% y/y) and +0.6% in quarter 3 (2.6% y/y). However, despite providing massive monetary stimulus, the European Central Bank is still struggling to get inflation up to its 2% target and in November inflation was 1.5%. It is therefore unlikely to start on an upswing in rates until possibly 2019. It has, however, announced that it will slow down its monthly QE purchases of debt from €60bn to €30bn from January 2018 and continue to at least September 2018.

USA. Growth in the American economy has been volatile in 2015 and 2016. 2017 followed that path again with quarter 1 coming in at only 1.2% but quarter 2 rebounding to 3.1% and quarter 3 coming in at 3.2%, the first time since 2014 that two successive quarters have been over 3%. Unemployment in the US has also fallen to the lowest level for many years, reaching 4.1% in November, while wage inflation pressures, and inflationary pressures in general, have been building. The Fed has started on an upswing in rates with four increases since December 2016 to lift the central rate to 1.25 – 1.50%. There could then be another four more increases in 2018. In October, the Fed became the first major western central bank to make a start on unwinding quantitative easing by phasing in a start to a gradual reduction of reinvesting maturing debt.

CHINA. Economic growth has been weakening over successive years, despite repeated rounds of central bank stimulus; medium term risks are increasing. Major progress still needs to be made to eliminate excess industrial capacity and the stock of unsold property, and to address the level of non-performing loans in the banking and credit systems.

JAPAN. GDP growth has been gradually improving during 2017 to reach an annual figure of 2.1% in quarter 3. However, it is still struggling to get inflation anywhere near to its target of 2%, despite huge monetary and fiscal stimulus. It is also making little progress on fundamental reform of the economy.

5.2 Credit and Counterparty Risk Management

Specified and Non-Specified Investments and Limits

Specified Investments

'Specified' investments are sterling investments of not more than one year maturity made with any institution meeting the minimum 'high' quality criteria where applicable

Non-Specified Investments

These are any investments which do not meet the specified investment criteria. A maximum of 50% will be held in aggregate in non-specified investment

A variety of investment instruments will be used, subject to the credit quality of the institution, and depending on the type of investment made it will fall into one of the above categories.

Investments of up to 2 years will continue to be allowed with the Royal Bank of Scotland (RBS) Group, since no material change in Government ownership is expected during that period. This policy will allow the PCC to lock in investment returns whilst continuing to adopt a low risk approach.

The proposed criteria for (a) Specified and (b) Non-Specified investments are presented below for approval.

a) Specified Investments

These investments are sterling investments of not more than one-year maturity, or those which could be for a longer period but where the PCC has the right to be repaid within 12 months if it wishes.

	Minimum credit criteria / colour band	Maximum investment per institution	Maximum maturity period
The PCC's own banker if it fails to meet the basic credit criteria. In this instance balances will be minimised as far as is possible.		Minimal	
DMADF – UK Government	N/A	No limit	6 months
Money Market Funds (MMF)	AAA by at least 2 rating agencies and minimum asset base of £500m	£25m or 1% of total asset base per institution whichever is the lower figure	Liquid (instant access)
Local authorities	N/A	£10m	1 year
Term deposits with banks and building societies	Blue Orange Red Green	£40m £30m £20m £15m	Up to 1 year Up to 1 year Up to 6 months Up to 100 days
CDs or corporate bonds with banks and building societies	Blue Orange Red Green	£40m £30m £20m £15m	Up to 1 year Up to 1 year Up to 6 months Up to 100 days

b) Non-Specified Investments

Non-specified investments are any other type of investment (i.e. not defined as 'specified' above). The identification and rationale supporting the selection of these other investments, and the maximum limits to be applied, are set out below.

Non-specified investments would include any sterling investments with:

	Minimum credit criteria / colour band	Maximum investment per institution	Maximum maturity period
Local authorities	N/A	£10m	5 years
Term deposits with banks and building societies	Purple Blue (RBS)	£30m £20m	Up to 2 years Up to 2 years
CDs or corporate bonds with banks and building societies	Purple Blue (RBS)	£30m £40m	Up to 2 years Up to 2 years

5.3 Approved Countries for investments

AAA

- Australia
- Canada
- Denmark
- Germany
- Luxembourg
- Netherlands
- Norway
- Singapore
- Sweden
- Switzerland

AA+

- Finland
- U.S.A.
- Hong Kong

AA

- Abu Dhabi (UAE)
- France
- U.K.

AA-

- Belgium
- Qatar

THIS LIST IS AS AT 15.01.18