MINUTES OF A MEETING OF THE JOINT INDEPENDENT AUDIT COMMITTEE HELD AT POLICE HEADQUARTERS, KIDLINGTON ON 21 SEPTEMBER 2018 COMMENCING AT 10.30AM AND CONCLUDING AT 12:15 PM

Members Present:
Dr L Lee (Chairman), Dr G A Woods, Richard Jones, Alison Phillips OBE

Present:
M Barber (Deputy Police & Crime Commissioner)
P Hammond (Chief Executive, OPCC)
I Thompson (Chief Finance Officer, OPCC)
F Habgood (Chief Constable)
J Campbell (Deputy Chief Constable)
R France (Chief Supt.)
A Cooper (Director of Information)
N Shovell (Chief Internal Auditor, OPCC)
A Shearn (Principal, Auditor, OPCC)
A Balmer (Manager, Ernst & Young)
M Horne (Governance & Service Improvement)

Apologies:
A Stansfeld (Police & Crime Commissioner)
M Day (Panel member)
L Waters (Director of Finance)
P King (Associate Partner, Ernst & Young)
C Roberts (Executive Assistant to the PCC/DPCC, OPCC)

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76   APOLOGIES/OTHER

The Chair welcomed attendees and gave apologies from the PCC, Anthony Stansfeld (PCC), Linda Waters (LW), Mike Day (MD), Paul King (PK) Ernst & Young and Charlotte Roberts (CR). CR had gone home unwell and today's meeting would be recorded but deleted after the minutes had been typed.

The first item to be discussed was not down as an agenda item and was referred to by the Chair as 'Agenda Item 0' and was a plea that the JIAC papers should be with the Committee members a week before the meeting. The Chair had noted the papers were getting later and pleaded with attendees to make sure that for the next meeting, the Committee have the papers in time to read. If the Force and PCC's office felt that this Committee was of importance, the papers should arrive on time to help provide assurances.

Deputy Chief Constable, John Campbell (JC) noted there were two processes in relation to providing agenda items and delivering on time.   PH pointed out that due to sickness, the OPCC did not have the required cover in the office to make up for that gap.

The Chair also noted that the papers the Committee received seemed to have been rushed. The charts and spreadsheets had lines missing which was very frustrating for the reader if sentences and sections were not complete.

77   PART I MINUTES OF THE LAST MEETING HELD ON 13 JULY 2018

Part 1 of the Minutes of the last meeting held on 13 July 2018 were gone through for accuracy.

The Chair signed the Minutes virtually as a true record as agreed by the Committee members.

Matters arising not otherwise on the Agenda

These were helpfully shown in 'red' as follows:

On page 5, Minute 60: There was a paper at the end of today's agenda which covered this action.

On page 7 - Minute 62: NS confirmed he had included in all Annual Reports a comparison against prior year assurance ratings and this was reflected in the paper today.

Page 7 - Minute 63: IT confirmed he had removed the incorrect sentence in paragraph 1.6 on page 184 and this was reflected in the paper today.

Page 7 - Minute 63: IT had reported back to the Committee with an explanation as to how the PCC had made improvements within the OPCC.

Page 8 - Minute 64: IT had revised the Capital Expenditure figure on page 28 of the Report prior to the Level 1 meeting and contained all the information the Committee requested. The Committee had no further questions on this.

Page 9 - Minute 66: MH confirmed that the 2018 work had been completed in relation to the status of the ISO work.

Page 9 - Minute 66: AC had provided the Committee with a revised spreadsheet of risks at the end of the last meeting and this was now complete.

Outstanding Action Page 13 - Minute 71: The Committee were awaiting Norma Brown (NB) to come back to them on a follow-up on how many BAME people get through the recruitment process other than non-BAME. This was an important issue and the Committee asked that NB provide this information to them by email.

Page 14 - Minute 73: NS confirmed he had provided a 'follow up' to the Committee and this was included in the Audit Report.

Page 14 - Minute 73: NS confirmed he had updated Amanda Cooper as to the overdue actions in the audit.

78   ANNUAL REPORT OF THE SENIOR INFO RISK OWNER (SIRO) 2017/18

Amanda Cooper (AC) reminded the Committee that this paper was written in July and some items that have happened already happened but would be updated. AC reminded the Committee as to paragraph 1 of the history of the departments and the formation and governance that was currently going on. There was real improvement and AC and her team were now part of the Hampshire Constabulary team (which was equivalent to this meeting). There had been some really good work by Neil Shovell (NS) in working with the Chair of their Joint Audit Committee.

At the July JCOG meeting (shown at item 7 on page 18) there was a paper re-affirming the roles of the Information Asset Owners. All Chief Officers were in agreement across both forces which was approved. The JIMU had been working closely with both forces, particularly since GDPR and had the relevant training and resources in place to support them.

There were a number of regional projects and programmes going on both in the operational business area and also in the technology business area and key to the straight-forward and pragmatic delivery of these, was having common security and information assurance policies and principles wherever possible.

As to IT Health Checks (item 3.2), this was an audit action where the Force needed to make sure it was submitted this year but also that the checks were built into the timetable going forwards. That health check had now been completed and the reports came in at the end of July. This has been turned into an 'action plan'. As you would expect with any organisation, there was still a lot to do but have turned those into 'budget bids' that would go into the organisation's medium term financial planning process to ensure the organisation had the resources and the prioritisation to do that work. AC confirmed that at the JCOG meeting, the bids were coming up as 'high priority' and these were advocated.

AC updated the Committee on Protective Monitoring and informed the Committee there was a protective wrap-around for the majority of the external threats and that gave some of the data later on in the report. The other programme that was ongoing was working very closely with the Deputy's teams and Professional Standards which showed pro-active monitoring. This was looking more at the insider threat where again the Force were using same tool as used in Sussex and Surrey. There was an early bid for a targeted monitoring approach and late bids going in for a force wide approach to that also.

Item 3.6 Public Services Network (PSN) Compliance, AC reminded the Committee that there were no implications of not achieving the accreditation. PSN would be migrating, contracts were changing and the Home Office had a programme to run that hopefully linked activities of work with IT Health Checks.

Item 22 was the General Information Risk Return (GIRR). This had been completed and had been sent off to the National Police Information Risk Team who would process it. The responses were still currently awaited.

Item 3.7 was for the business area which crossed over into a lot of others but had already been covered by PSD, Security and Property Services. AC reported a much better engagement with both Forces in all departments.

Item 3.8 showed the activity that had taken place this year to address the actions identified towards the end of 2016/17 in the Internal Audit Reports. It had been very helpful in engaging with NS and the Senior Management teams as there were now regular meetings. AC had spoken to ICT SMT and confirmed this was a significant agenda item at their monthly meetings.

Item 3.9 was the Preparation for Data Protection Legislation changes (GDPR). AC received regular updates on where the Force were on GDPR and reports were still being received on performance in that area. It was really important that the Force showed visibility and auditable governance processes around that. As a precursor to that work, Marion Peuleve's (MP) team had provided a really visible decision tree and policy around how to make decisions about data that you confirm so that if there was any that needed to be retained, the Force could clearly show the thinking and decision making around that in an event of any challenge. This paper went to the JCOG meeting and had oversight of the data control yesterday.

AC gave a summary of the various Public Access requests which were summarised and shared with the Chief Constable's periodically through the JCOG and Performance of the Information Sharing Agreement. The one disappointing aspect relating to both this and GDPR was that the Force were waiting for some standardised training for GDPR to go out to all employees. The College of Policing had been slow in producing and releasing that training and there had been some technical problems with it. A situation arose at the beginning of the year and all Forces experienced problems in completing and returning this. The latest version they intend issuing to Forces would be in October and, in order to overcome the technical difficulty, they decided that the online training would not have a pass or fail mark. As (SIRO), AC did not think this was appropriate and so the training departments of Thames Valley and Hampshire used exactly the same training and under the 'Moodle Tool' which applied a 'pass' and 'fail' mark. The Force reported back to the National SIRO and believed that this was appropriate. This has now been prioritised as training and been given a deadline but was really disappointing as the organisation had everything lined up to complete this by the time the app came in. The Commissioner for the City of London was following this up with the College of Policing but in the meantime, AC wanted to assure the Committee members of the high standards that MP advocates and that staff do realise that this was important to do. This has resulted in an increase in workload for MP and her team but they were managing this well. AC felt reassured that people understood this as important and were aware of this in their own lives which had helped with the culture change within the Force.

Section 4 related to Information Security Incident Management. The data in the tables showed 'all security incidents' (see Appendix C). From a governance perspective, that was dealt with through meetings that sat under the Force Security Manager which was security information led. AC felt there was a bit of a gap between the SIRO and her business area and AC confirmed she would now join the Deputy Chief Constable's Force Security meetings to ensure there was closer involvement at a strategic level.

Item 4.2 summarised the various vulnerabilities or attack attempts which have reduced. AC wanted the Committee to be reassured that the Force understood this data which is assessed.

Item 5 showed a variety of SIRO decisions that AC made, some of which were about ensuring that programmes were delivered, others around making sure that the Force can get the niche capabilities that are

needed in for programmes and then others such as Cut & Paste are simply to challenge the Force around some of those security rules in order to assist operational users to enable those capabilities.

Section 6 showed the key areas for the coming year and where the areas of focus were.

The Chair commented that this was overall a good and easy to read paper which gave the Committee assurance that information management was being taken seriously by the Force.

The Chair then followed with questions, in particular on Page 10 of the Annual IT Health Check and indicated there was an action plan and budget bids as a result of this. The Chair asked whether this had been reflected in the risk register. AC confirmed that these were in the ICT Departmental Risk Register but this had not scored high enough to be considered for strategic risks. However, these were reviewed monthly at ICT meetings.

In relation to page 22 and without divulging any details, the Chair asked whether the case that was currently being appealed was complete or still ongoing. AC confirmed this had now been completed but she could not remember the outcome but would come back to the Committee with an update.

Action: AC to update the Committee as to the outcome of the appeal case set out on page 22.

The Chair pointed out that three complaints were upheld and five were not. The Chair wanted to know what lessons had been learned from the complaints upheld and whether processes and procedures had been tightened up. AC would provide a summary for both Forces that she received from the Information Management Board and would email these to the Committee.

The Chair was curious as to item number 34 where at the end of March, 87 ISAs were in place in Hampshire and asked AC whether that included any commercial organisation the force may work with which may have to share information. AC believed this was dealt with through the commercial contracting arrangements rather than partnership but would forward confirmation to the Committee members. However, some of the delay in the figures was getting a signed agreement back from the partners.

Action: AC to provide a summary for both forces of the information received from the Information Management Board as to the Committee's query shown at item number 34.

The Chair wished to address the last sentence in Section 36, a 'culture of under-reporting'. AC confirmed that Hampshire were under-reporting. Thames Valley were in a more advanced place around closer working regarding force security and property. Hampshire did not have a Force Security Manager or a set department dealing with that and so it was scattered across Risk and PSD but had started to amalgamate and working more closely.   AC noted that it was an absence of ease of process as much as a culture. What the Force have done in the 'service now tool' is to build in the ability to report security incident information through this to make it much easier for people to report.

Committee member, Richard Jones (RJ) wanted to explore this in just a little more detail referring to the summary of reported security incidents table shown on page 31 which showed a disproportionately large number of incidents in Thames Valley compared with Hampshire and the assertion that this was as a result of under-reporting from Hampshire but an alternative interpretation of this data was a culture of poor performance against the requirements of the policies in Thames Valley. RJ asked if there was any evidence to back up the assertion that this was under-reporting rather than poor conduct. AC referred the Committee to the national figures. The Force supplied all of this data nationally and it gets searched across a set number of data tables and was a mixed batch. Looking at the disclosure ones, the majority of these were CPS and around redaction of disclosure files and there was a programme that dealt with that. It was known that the CPS in Hampshire had not been reporting back to the Force so there was an unawareness of them. These were discussed at the Information Governance Board. Some of these would get better by using the 'Service Now Tools' and were working closely with Force Security to give reassurance.

JC confirmed he chaired the Force Security and to give offices and staff more IT equipment and to mitigate these risks around encryption which had recently been discussed this week. The discrepancy of loss or theft of technology assets between Hampshire and TV is not a true picture. A lost report is recorded as soon as someone has gone, the case for a large number of individuals, but the lost reported figure is not modified when the equipment is located. The high figure seen in the table goes on to the national return and are not necessary reflecting devices never seen again.

Action: AC to find out the figures and report back to the Committee members with an update.

RJ felt reassured with AC's update.

79   TVP RISK MANAGEMENT REPORT

JC led on the issues for consideration for strategic risks and referenced the fact on the back of audit advice. The Force would be looking at risks and assessing them and adopting the 4T approach to risk management to record the current status of each risk as part of their recommendations as follows:

- **TOLERATE, TREAT, TRANSFER ,TERMINATE**

JC went on to summarise the risks on SR56 LiveLink. The SharePoint Board's observations included the Project Board to continue to investigate viable technological contingencies, although a number of partners contacted had been unable or unwilling to quote for supporting LiveLink in its current form. ICT had now reviewed technical back-up options which were not straightforward. A number of areas of high operational risk should LikeLink fail for a week had been identified and these would be prioritised in terms of internal support. Three adopted recommendations at this stage were also presented in the report.

The current risk for SR65 Gazetteers was that the gazetteer currently in use in Charm + Oasis was out of date. This would be resolved when CMP rolls out live as the new ESRI GIS Mapping Gazetteer would be used by CMP. There was only one adopted recommendation at this stage where the activities remained at a level of low risk and other mitigating actions were tied to the RMS project.

As to SR69 Insufficient Funding, the level of funding received in future years may not be sufficient to maintain the current level of service. The increasing level of demand and the complexity of new and emerging crimes may require a level of resources which was unaffordable. The adopted recommendation of this was that the risk remained on the SRR and continued to be treated as per the mitigating actions outlined in this section.

SR74 Workforce Resilience was led by Dr Steven Chase. There was a significant number of officers below establishment whilst demand on the Force had risen. The primary drivers for this appeared to be natural loss i.e. retirement and resignation and transferring to other Forces. CCMT have agreed to three additional PC courses and one additional PCSO course. Additional resources and accommodation were currently being considered to achieve this. The risk continued to be treated through the actions proposed by monthly Gold Groups with regular updates going to CCMT.

JC went through section 2.2 of the new risks added to the strategic risk register at the September FRMG. At this stage the adopted recommendations was being managed. There had been a request that both risks should appear on both Force Strategic Registers and it was recommended that both risks were treated with FRMG taking the lead on oversight of the mitigating actions and monitoring project progress with the Force recommending that the CMP risks with the agreed working should be added to the Strategic Risk Register to bring the two Forces in line.

As to Investigation Management (Release under Investigation) this was due to a change in the Bail Act due to the number of people on bail when released from custody. What has been seen is that there has been a reduction in criminal justice outcomes in this area. This is a complex area of the Bail Act and has an increasing demand as well as resourcing issues. The risk is owned by ACC Tim De Meyer.

The Force are currently putting in place contingency plans in relation to the impact of Brexit which the government is helping and supporting with (Risk Radar Section 2.3) but to keep in mind a 'No Deal' Brexit and the potential operational difficulties and what the consequences would be.

As to section 2.4 Future Risk Work, the Force continued to develop work around revised risk processes and very keen to seek the input of the Committee to ensure that the future reporting of risk and business continuity meet their needs.

The Chair referred to the last bullet point on page 36 and asked if the risks increased, what were the mitigating factors that the Force would implement to manage this increase. AC confirmed that the re-scoring of ICT was around an assessment of bringing the risk up if it goes down. The consequences if that raised the risk, would be where the Force look at the mitigating actions and come to a decision around prioritisation of either money

or resources in order to rectify those risks. It also impacted on decisions if the work had not been done although this was not a numeric exercise.

In relation to SR74 Workforce Resilience on page 37, the Chair confirmed having read this that the Committee were aware of the potential delays in CMP until next year but the wording did not give the Committee further reassurance of no further delays. Chief Supt. Rob France (RF) tried to make the wording as up-to-date as possible with the latest date for CMP being relatively recent. The Committee knew there would be a delay but did not feel that reading the paper this had been taken into account in all the actions and risks etc. The delay was until May 2019 and perhaps the language could have been clearer. RF confirmed that this was a different delay with different risks but accepted that the paper could have been made clearer.

The Committee were surprised that CMP was only very recently recognised in September 2018 as being a 'Strategic Risk' and asked why this was not on the radar prior to September as this was an issue now rather than a risk. JC confirmed that this was an 'issue' now rather than a 'risk'.

As to the issues around re-baselining of the project, the PCC challenged the Force in holding them to account as to extending the deadline and asking the PCCs for additional funding. It was reported that this was the reasoning behind this but was also the tolerance around certain programmes of work around cost and delivery through normal business processes the force would manage but with the delay at this time, both Forces were managing the delays and have recognised it should now go on the Strategic Risk Register. The response was accepted by the Chair although he wanted to ensure that lessons were learned from this and wanted this noted as an observation.

Chief Constable Francis Habgood (FH) pointed out that you needed to be careful about putting every single programme on to the Strategic Risk Register because it is a programme which is complex. The Force manage the risks around programmes and has visibility in the Force Transformation Board and this was flagged up at regular meetings and was on the radar. The Committee reflected their views that assurance was required that risks were managed properly and in their opinion projects that were huge and affected a lot of departments was something the Committee needed to be aware of. It was for the PCC/CC to decide whether they wished a little bit more information to be presented to the Committee to be able to provide the assurance that was required.

One question of detail on CMP at item 2.2 showed two risks listed but only one was scored. The first risk was recorded fairly high but the second risk the CMP system had not been scored in anyway and had not been reflected in the paper. MH would look into this and find out what this was and update the Committee thereafter.

Action: MH to look at item 2.2 and update the Committee as to the risk that had not been scored.

In relation to the impact on Brexit and how to take a measured approach, Alison Phillips (AP) asked how confident were the Force given the very high percentage of people arrested in TV who were foreign nationals that might be impacted more than others by some kind of delay of failure or information sharing in European Parliaments.

FH noted that a meeting had taken place with the Chiefs and representatives. On the loss on certain powers the NCA were leading on this. There were alternative provisions that could be used for some countries. There were some provisions which are more complicated as well as time consuming. Some will require bilateral arrangements but often some of the Forces operations do not just involve two countries and this then becomes more complicated and slower but there were ways of working round that and part of the plan was to have an additional team at the centre to work through that whether it's a 'No Deal' or in the transitional period of whatever follows on from transmission which is funded by the Home Office. The second part was the operational impact on policing whether it is protests or disorder and there are planning arrangements in place for that as well. FH reassured the JIAC that measures have been taken and are in place.

80   TVP BUSINESS CONTINUITY REPORT

The Business Continuity Update provided an annual overview of Thames Valley Police most recent quarterly processes adopted, covering issues such as training, learning from business continuity incidents and training exercises.

JC summarised the Force-wide incidents during the period May 2018 to July 2018 with the adverse weather causing a flood on 30 May in Milton Keynes Police Station which affected a number of areas but mainly the kitchen, corridors and loading bays. On 7 July 2018 there was a flood in the basement of High Wycombe Police Station from a burst water pipe and on 9 July 2018 a water outage at Slough Police Station which followed a period of low water pressure through the night. On 17 July 2018 a further flood occurred in High Wycombe Police Station caused by a secondary pipe failure. Both water and electricity supply were stopped for a number of hours and the plan invoked. There were learning observations from these events as staff were able to work from home.

There were three ICT incidents during the period May 2018 to July 2018 and ICT submitted two priority one incidents. There were no priority incidents which presented a significant issue or caused a business continuity plan to be invoked. An ICT incident took place on 16 May 2018 at 11:50 when the Control Room lost phone service and 999 calls were cut off and the CHARM and Command and Control systems froze. All services resumed within one minute and the root cause was due to a router being brought back on line following the resolution of another fault. On 24 July 2018 at 02:00 all telephones and the network in Slough failed which also affected both Control Rooms and the Police Enquiry Centre (PEC). As a result of supplier action this was corrected within ten minutes and phones, which had de-registered, were all re-registered.

At Section 2.2 the current business continuity activities were summarised by JC to include the exercise run for finance to test their plan on 6 August. A few lessons were learned around their adding priorities and deadlines to the plan. The second yearly exercise for Forensics to ensure compliance with their accreditation needs was booked for 20 September 2018. Business Continuity Training had been arranged for October for all corporate governance officers, corporate strategy researchers and the corporate governance manager. JC noted that going forwards and planned for the next period were the designs for the new business continuity plan and business impact analysis templates as well as designs for new reporting documents for CCMT and JIAC and People Directorate BC exercise would be taking place on 27 November 2018.

The Committee supported the pyramid on page 44 but would like to see a reference or a column of what the lowest numbers for P1 to P3 were.

Action: JC to include number reference points to the pyramid on page 44 of the agenda for each section P1, P2 and P3.

The Committee APPROVED the recommendations and noted the report as appropriate.

81   OPCC RISK REGISTER

PH summarised the five risks in the register set out in Appendix 1 to the report.

OPCC18 - Funding may be insufficient to deliver the PCC's Police & Crime Plan strategic objectives. This risk mirrors and enforces the risk register. The PCC had not yet committed himself to the £12.00 Council Tax increase. A strategic planning exercise would be taking place next week.

OPCC19 - The demand for victims' services could exceed current supply. The new Victims First Hub went live in March 2018 and were still in the process of recruiting a Data Quality Officer to monitor service demand. The Hub had experienced retention issues with staff, mainly because of the nature of the work, which was currently still an issue.

OPCC20 – Unable to evidence delivery of strategic priorities and key aims in the PCC's Police and Crime Plan could cause reputational damage for the PCC. The OPCC were currently working with the Force to try and align the Forces Delivery Plan activities and outcomes with the PCC Police & Crime Plan strategic priority and internal strategic plan. The OPCC had been developing an infographic with all the updated information into the Police & Crime Plan to provide a 'go to' page on the website to get a position statement of how well the PCC was doing in delivery his aims.

OPCC21 – A review was being undertaken of the OPCC victims 'specialist counselling service' to identify potential weaknesses in internal management controls and administrative procedures e.g. non-compliance with GDPR, disclosure requirements that required significant investment in OPCC time, resource and cost to rectify. The consequences of this would be loss of service to victims, reputational damage to the PCC, fined under GDPR and pre-trial therapy/disclosure implications. It was felt that this was a bit too early to comment on this.

OPCC22 – The forthcoming upgrade of Niche RMS by TVP could lead to disruption of the data flow to provide a victim's data extract that could be uploaded on to Apricot CMS at the Victims First Hub. In turn this could cause loss of efficiency of working in the Hub, reputational damage and gap or loss of service for victims. Issues had been flagged up with the Force and plans put in place for an internal TVP communication plan in the event of a system failure and for victims to self-refer themselves. Not expecting any problems but there were internal and external plans in place.

The Committee noted that this was the second time the colours on pages 52, 53 and 54 needed to be rectified where the risk rating colour was shown as 'green' and in fact should be coloured 'red'. PH confirmed he would rectify the colourings on the Risk Register.

Action: PH to update the colours of the Risk Ratings from Green to Red as shown on pages 52, 53 and 54.

The Committed NOTED the five issues on the OPCC Risk Register and endorsed the proposed changes.

82   ERNST & YOUNG ANNUAL AUDIT LETTER FOR YEAR ENDED 31 MARCH 2018

Adrian Balmer (AB) went through the report and highlighted some small changes and key elements in the Executive Summary and confirmed that the audit was now complete with no issues to report. Ernst & Young completed the audit completion certificate to the PCC and CC on 29 August 2018.

AB went through some of the significant risks, conclusions and the valuation methods applied in relation to (GAD) Government Actuary Department and the Local Government Scheme with Bucks County Council in relation to fund asset valuations. Ernst & Young were building into the audit plan for next year to liaise with Grant Thornton to get an earlier report completed because of the late reporting issues.

The Code of Practice on Local Authority Accounting in the UK has introduced the application of new accounting standards in future years. The impact on the PCC was also summarised by AB.

IT confirmed there would be no impact for TVP but the OPCC were aware. The deadline for consultation finished a month ago. However, a response had been submitted and officers now await an update from CIPFA, to see what the impact will be.

The OPCC was currently considering all leases but this did not come into effect until next year, a response was submitted, but awaiting CIPFA update.

83   ERNST & YOUNG POLICE SECTOR AUDIT COMMITTEE BRIEFING

The Committee read the briefing and all were satisfied with the contents.

The Committee wished for the Force Management Statement to be added to the next agenda item in December 2018. However, FF confirmed that this was 'not' a public document as there were still some national issues to deal with. From what FF understood was that the Committee required the 'process' as opposed to how this was being used. The CMP paper to be provided in December for JIAC and to be agreed by TVP. It was confirmed that there would **not** be a separate paper for JIAC but a paper to show the oversighted governance although this would not go over the detail.

Action: TVP to provide the Committee the CMP paper for the December meeting to show the oversighted governance.

84   PROGRESS ON 2018/19 INTERNAL AUDIT PLAN DELIVERY AND SUMMARY OF MATTERS ARISING FROM COMPLETED AUDITS

NS ran through the main points in the report that provided details of the progress made in delivering the 2018/19 Joint Internal Audit Plan and the findings arising from the audited which had been completed. There was a slight change made to the Joint Internal Audit Plan 2018/19 since the previous JIAC meeting in July based on ICT's current workload and priorities. It was agreed to remove the ICT Network Management audit but increase the coverage for the Asset Management audit as this was a greater area of risk. A Governance and Service Improvement Post Programme Review was also included in the changes.

The Cabinet Office's 2016/17 NFI exercise was completed with all priority matches being reviewed and no issues identified. Work on the 2018/19 NFI exercise has commenced and Amy Shearn (AS) is working on this, liaising with the relevant departments across the Force and the OPCC. The 2018/19 NFI matches would be made available from the 31 January 2019.

One recent issue had been notified by Professional Standards Department (PSD) relating to the mishandling of property (cash). This issue was investigated and a management report produced. The property was located and the report recommended actions which included a review of local procedures for handling and tracking property. There was no requirement to change the current Audit Plan.

85   PROGRESS ON DELIVERY OF AGREED ACTIONS IN INTERNAL AUDIT REPORTS

AS reported that the report detailed progress made to date and target implementation dates for any current overdue actions, of which there were 17 (down from 21). There were currently 8 priority and 1 overdue actions with details being set out in Appendix 1. As to Priority 2 rated overdue actions, there were none specifically drawn to the attention of the Committee. There had been a couple of changes to the report format one on statistics analysis and trends and also a change in Appendix 3 on page 124 where figures have been introduced to show the overall agreed actions there were from the audit (Priority 1 and 2 only) and the number completed and over due to give a wider picture to the Committee.

AP confirmed that this was a very clear and informative document.

NS confirmed that in relation to the current position set out on page 125 to confirm that the bulk of the remaining People Directorate policies sat within People Services. The priority for People Services at the moment was recruitment as TVP was significantly under establishment (PCs, PCSOs and Police Staff in Contact Management) Policies were being updated as time and other priorities allowed. NS indicated this was on the radar but had received through the plan People Services were working to.

86   WRITTEN UPDATE BY PHILIP PALING, HEAD OF HEALTH, SAFETY & ENVIRONMENT OF IMPROVEMENTS MADE

JC summarised the update provided to the Committee by Philip Paling (PP) to show continuing improvement.

Date of next meeting 7 December 2018 at 10.30am the Conference Hall, TVP Headquarters South